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Summary
During the last decades, major efforts are being made to address the identification problems
in causal analysis in presence of interactions1 between units. Within this framework,
interferences have a twofold relevance. On the one hand, the recent reform of EU Cohesion
Policies promotes the development of knowledge networks and scale effects in regions
having both existing strengths and the potential for diversification in related sectors, activities,
or technologies (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2013). Moreover, promoting the creation of
linkages between institutions, firms and research centres, this approach aims to maximize
knowledge spillovers and, on the whole, innovation and growth (Barca, 2009; Garcilazo and
Oliveira Martins, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2015).
On the other hand, Rubin Causal Model, being based on SUTVA hypothesis, explicitly
rules out the occurrence of interactions between units (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983), i.e. no-interference assumption states that the treatment of a unit does
not depend on the state of treatment of the others. Assuming the validity of the SUTVA
makes possible the evaluation of the causal effect of the treatment. Nonetheless, it cannot
allow to estimate the occurrence of spillover effects. Starting from this point, this thesis
aims to propose an alternative theoretical and methodological framework which, including
interferences in causal analysis, enables the identification and estimation of both direct and
indirect treatment effects.
In short, the major innovations introduced in this Thesis consist of the development of two
alternative DID approaches. The first 2, considering the localization or not in agglomerated
labour market areas, develops two different causal effects on the controls. The second
approach3 allows to decompose the ATE in both direct and indirect effects by means
of a combination of spatial and hierarchical methodologies. This approach, including
spatial interferences in the regression model of a Diff-in-Diff approach, demonstrates the
unbiasdeness of the ATE even in presence of interactions. However, a correct estimation of
total, direct and indirect effects requires the use of the novel SH-DID.
During the early stages of this research4, I aimed to find an answer to the following questions:
• How we can include spillover effects in causal analysis?
• What is the dimension of proximity more adaptable to causal context?
1In the remainder of the thesis we use interchangeably the terms interactions and interferences.
2see Chapter 2.
3The evaluation of the performances of the SH-DID estimator is discussed in Chapter 3 by Montecarlo
Simulation, while in Chapter 4 we propose an empirical application of the novel method.
4This dissertation is organized in 4 different, even if related, papers. To make an easier subdivision of
the different contributes I devote a chapter for each papers in the thesis. Moreover, considering the shared
reference literature, some repetitions are present in the text. However, every chapter of this dissertation proposes
a different innovative contribute to existing literature.
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• Is it possible to identify both direct and indirect effects?
• Is ATE, in presence of interferences, biased?
However, find a solution to this questions is not straightforward and has required an in-depth
investigation of causal framework in presence of interferences. This analysis is included in
Chapter 1. In Section 1.1 we introduce the concept of knowledge spillovers, remarking the
key role played by different dimension of proximity in facilitating their diffusion (Boschma,
2005). Notwithstanding, our interest is limited to spatial and geographical proximity be-
tween units. This decision is compatible with policy evaluation framework, in particular
when the aim of the researcher is the evaluation of the additionality of R&D policy on SMEs.
Section 1.2 presents the actual state of the art of causal inference in presence of interactions
between units. In literature we can distinguish the presence of three distinct approaches.
The first, which we can define the ”empirical” approach, suggests the development of ap-
propriate causal estimands to determine the additional effects of the interferences5 (Cerqua
and Pellegrini, 2014; Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush, 2012; Sobel, 2006). The second
approach identifies spillover effects designing multi-level experiment (Sinclair et al., 2012).
Finally, Manski (1993) assumes the impossibility to distinguish between endogenous and
contextual interactions, i.e. the so-called ”Reflection Problem”. Solutions to the identifi-
cation problems includes alternative approaches to the linear-in-mean model (Brock and
Durlauf, 2001; Moffitt, 2001), restrictions on the shape of response function (Manski, 2013)
and estimation of structural interaction effects (Lee, 2006). The methodological implication
of the ”Reflection Problem” is explained in Section 1.3.
Moreover, we show how, in presence of interferences between units, linear model allows to
identify only the overall effect of neighbours’ characteristic. Notwithstanding, spatial and
hierarchical methodologies allows to address the identification problems of causal effects
6 (Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Corrado and Fingleton, 2012; Gibbons et al., 2014). In
Section 1.4 we discuss how the novel approaches presented in the remainder of the thesis
can be placed in the context of the actual literature on policy evaluation.
The methodological innovation proposed in Chapter 2 is a novel spatial Difference-in-
Differences estimator. This estimator is used to evaluate the effectiveness of R&D incentives
to private firms allocated by Region Umbria in the period between 2004 and 20097. Our
approach compares distinct treatment effects on the basis of the localization in the main
local market areas of Umbria (Perugia and Terni). In this way we are able to control for the
presence of technological spillovers due to both geographical and economic proximity (see
Section 2.2).
5The ”empirical” approach is the one followed in Chapter 2.
6A combination of spatial and hierarchical techniques is implement in Chapters 3 and 4 by the development
of a novel SH-DID model.
7The analysis of the characteristics of the policies and the dataset is presented in Section 2.1.
vThe peculiarity of our approach is to consider the presence of interactions within the LMAs,
assuming a limitation on the validity of the SUTVA limited to firms located in different
LMAs. Therefore, our assumption imposes the restriction that the interferences among
subsidized and controls are relevant only inside the LMAs and not significant outside. Under
this assumption, we develop a framework which makes possible the estimation of two
specific causal effects:
Average Treatment Effect using the Influenced Controls (ATEIC):
ATEIC =E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 0, LMA = 1]−
E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 0, LMA = 1]
Average Treatment Effect using the Uninfluenced Control (ATEUC):
ATEUC =E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 0, LMA = 1]−
E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 1, LMA = 0]− E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 0, LMA = 0]
The ATEIC and the ATEUC allow diversified impacts, depending on the choice of the
controls. The ATEUC represents the impact of the subsidies, taking into account the
interferences; the ATEIC is a measure of the error in the estimation of the effects when we
wrongly assume the validity of the SUTVA. However, the difference between ATEUC and
ATEIC provides a measure of the spillover effects in response of the subsidies.
The results, presented in 2.3, show a positive and significant impact of the incentives, in
particular for innovative outputs and the small firms. The magnitude of the impact is
influenced by geographical localization. The effect is higher on controls located outside
the main labour market areas, suggesting the presence of significant local technological
spillovers. To conclude, we have demonstrated how geographical localization and market
concentration can play a determinant role in estimating the effectiveness of the policies.
An alternative solution to identification problems in presence of interferences is presented in
Chapter 3. In this section we propose a causal framework8 within a new spatial hierarchical
Difference-in-Differences model (SH-DID). The ”traditional” DID model provides unbiased
estimates of the treatment effect, even if it omits the occurrence of interactions between
units. Including interferences in causal analysis requires, therefore, a substantial review of
the Diff-in-Diffs approach (see Section 3.2).
In this chapter, the interactions are approximated through a function based on neighbours’
state of treatment (Dj). In this way, we include in the regression model of a Diff-in-Diff the
variable Dj and its interaction with own state of treatment and the temporal dummy:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt (0.1)
8See Section 3.1.
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Applying the ”standard” Diff-in-Diffs approach to 0.1 we obtain the following ATE
ATE = β3 + β4(D1j −D0j ) + β6D1j (0.2)
The term D1j (resp. D
0
j ) indicates the average share of treated neighbours for subsidized
(resp. control) units. Under the formulation in 0.1 is possible to compute both direct and
indirect impact of the policies. The direct effect (ADTE) is estimated by the Diff-in-Diffs
for the units without treated in their neighbourhood, i.e. the ADTE represents the situation
in which there are not interactions due to the treatment.
Furthermore, model specification allows to estimated differentiated indirect effects on treated
and controls. The indirect effects are obtained through a double difference estimator with
respect to time and Dj , assuming own state of treatment constant. To resume, the novel
approach allows to define three distinct treatment effects9:
• ADTE = β3
• AITET = β4D1j + β6D1j
• AITENT = β4D0j
The performances of the SH-DID are evaluated by a Montecarlo Simulation in Section 3.3.
The results confirm how omitting the presence of interferences produces biased parameters
of direct and indirect effects, even if the estimates of the ATE in the linear model are
unbiased. Conversely, the SH-DID provides unbiased estimates of total, direct and indirect
effects. In addition, this model is the more efficient compared both to the traditional and a
Spatial modified Difference-in-Differences estimator.
Chapter 4 presents an empirical application of the SH-DID approach. This Chapter examines
the additionality of R&D policies distributed to Italian firms. In detail, we evaluate policy
effectiveness on R&D expenses using two different waves of the Community Innovation
Surveys10. The estimates in Section 4.4 demonstrate the additionality of the policies on
R&D expenditures.
Decomposing the ATE, we demonstrate positive and significant direct effects, while the
indirect impact is negative and meaningful, even if limited to the treated. Moreover, distance
influences the results, i.e. increasing the cut-off distance increase, in absolute value, the
intensity of the effects. To conclude, this thesis proposes a suitable empirical framework
able to take into account the inclusion of interferences between units in causal analysis.
Furthermore, our novel approaches could constitute a turning point on the definition of
political priority and efficiency of EU policies to promote knowledge spillovers and local
competitiveness.
9A complete description of direct and indirect effects is provided in Sections 3.2,3.A and 3.B.
10Section 4.3 shows a summary of the policies implemented in Italy in the period between 2007-2013.
Furthermore, this section discusses the construction of the dataset.
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1Chapter 1
Causal analysis and spillover effects
Many empirical questions in economics and other social sciences depend on causal effects
of programs or policies. Over the lasts decades, econometric and statistical analysis devote
major efforts for improving the correctness of the evaluation of the effects of the policies.
Nowadays, causal analysis reaches a level of development that makes it a fundamental
approach in many areas of empirical research in economics, including labour, development
and behavioural economics or studies focused on education. Despite the relevance of causal
analysis in such branches, this thesis focuses only on the study of causal analysis in policy
evaluation. In detail, in the remainder of this research we propose an in-depth analysis on
the relationship between R&D policies and the formation of spillover effects.
Combine these two concepts is not straightforward, but a substantial reconsideration of
traditional causal approach is needed. In point of fact, a large part of the recent literature
on program evaluation focuses on estimation of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) under
the methodological framework proposed in the seminal works of Rubin (1974, 1977) and
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Rubin’s formulation of causal inference problem, labelled
Rubin Causal Model (RCM) by Holland (1986), is recognized as the fundamental guideline
in both econometric and statistic literature. RCM, relying on potential outcome framework,
allows the identification of the causal impact under the assumption of "no interference
between difference units". This hypothesis, proposed by Cox (1959) and formalized in
Rubin (1980, 1986), constitutes a part of the SUTVA 1.
Assuming the validity of the SUTVA in traditional experimental approach implies the con-
sideration of interferences between units as nuisance terms. In this context, researchers aim
to model studies able to produce unbiased treatment effects by eliminating the presence
of interferences. Although, the validity of the SUTVA explicitly rules out spillover effects
1The value of the outcome for unit i when exposed to treatment t will be the same regardless of the
treatments that other units receive Rubin (1974).
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2 from the evaluation of policy effectiveness. In this sense, the incompatibility between
SUTVA and identification of indirect effects is clear. Nonetheless, during the last decade
major efforts are devoted to the development of experimental methods to include interactions
in causal analysis. The promotion of a novel framework from the perspectives of both
regional economists and policy-makers has a twofold relevance.
In recent years, research on urban and regional economics directs more attention on empiri-
cal studies. Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2014), analysing the evolution of research in these
branches, remark a growing trend of the number of empirical publication on the Journal of
Urban Economics. In detail, while in 1990 only the 49% of the works were empirical, after
20 years they become the 71% of overall publications. The increased interest of scientists
to empirical approach is a consequence of the refinement of the methodologies or it can be
considered the reflection of the reform process of regional policies? The development of
place-based policies can be correctly evaluate under the traditional framework or it requires
a novel approach able to take into account the formation of an additional ”indirect” causal
impact?
On one hand, Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2014), analysing the development of methodologies,
show how, in 1990, only a handful of papers attempt to deal with omitted variables problems,
while more than half of the total number of empirical publications, in 2010, use at least one
research design that is more sophisticated than simple OLS, such as differences in differ-
ences, instrumental variables or matching. Furthermore, the role played by research and
development as a tool to foster innovation and growth assumes a primary relevance in recent
regional policies. In particular, considering EU, the cornerstone in current cohesion policy
is the concept of ”Smart Specialization”3 based on the principles of a ”smart, sustainable
and inclusive growth”.
Smart Specialization, taking into account the economical heterogeneity between European
regions (von Tunzelmann, 2009), attempts to find a solution on the productivity gap between
Europe and USA. This novel approach focuses on vertical and non-neutral logic of interven-
tion. In other terms, it promotes a process of identification and selection of desirable areas
for intervention that could be favoured within the framework of the regional policy (Foray
and Goenaga, 2013). The identification of correct areas of specialization is obtained by an
entrepreneurial discovery process (EDP).
In the simplest sense, EDP is an exercise that ”reveals what a country does best in terms
of R&D and innovation” and is widely recognized as a fundamental feature to put concep-
tual distances between the previous (horizontal) and actual (bottom-up) policy framework
(Coffano and Foray, 2014; Capello, 2014). Anyway, this concept requires a complex and
2In this dissertation I will use the exchangeable term ”indirect effects” to refer to spillovers. In similar way,
the interaction between units is also called interferences.
3See Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union [COM(2010)546]; The EU Budget Review
[COM(2010)700]
3interactive collaboration between private and public agents. This interaction is based on the
coordinating capacity of private agents (i.e. firms) and the proactive role of public agents (i.e.
the state) to make easier and stimulate the entrepreneurial discovery process (Foray et al.,
2011). The heavy emphasis on the role of EDP might be construed as a neo-liberal plea for a
laissez-faire strategy, even if smart specialisation confers a broadest sense to entrepreneurial
knowledge, including a wide array of agents and institutions like firms, universities, public
laboratories, etc. (Morgan, 2015).
In addition, this process allows the sharing of information between local governments and
stakeholders with beneficial effect on local development and, potentially, on the entire
economic system (Barca, 2009; Garcilazo and Oliveira Martins, 2015). Rodríguez-Pose and
Wilkie (2015), remarking the fundamental role played by interactions between public and
private agents in EDP, suggest the development of process able to facilitate communication
between policy-maker and entrepreneurial agents. This process makes easier the aggregation
and synthesis of entrepreneurial knowledge and, as consequence, the implementation of
correctly designed place-based policies.
Notwithstanding, institutional environment constitutes a critical factor in creating this coop-
erative behaviour. It requires strong and well-functioning institutions to facilitate dialogue,
interaction and overall closeness to enable the effective communication of entrepreneurial
knowledge. Furthermore, the reinforcement in connectivity between developed areas and
peripheral regions is optimized by the identification and strengthening of local areas of
specialization. In this way, it is possible to maximize knowledge spillovers and innovation
in both areas4 OECD (2009a,b).
Foray and Goenaga (2013), on this issue: ”The reward for entrepreneurial discoveries has
to be structured in such a way that it will maximize these spillovers... When the initial experi-
ment and discovery are successful and diffused, other agents are induced to shift investments
away from older domains with less potential for growth than the new one. Entry is a key
ingredient of smart specialisation so that agglomeration externalities can be realised.”
The above mentioned authors highlight the different potential impact on both followers and
leader regions. On one hand, the firsts, by implementing smart specialization strategy, be-
come able to capture knowledge spillovers from the leaders. Following regions improve their
capacity to attract future knowledge assets by becoming part of a competitive environment
and creating a market niche. Conversely, leader regions is characterized by systems in which
discoveries are made continuously. This process enables the development of new activities
and strategic diversification, stimulating a dynamic innovation process. Nonetheless, this
proactive environment requires adaptive policies able to identify and support new waves of
technological opportunities.
Agrawal et al. (2010) recognise a key success factor in power market. These authors high-
4For further information on the topic : Krugman and Venables (1995); Fujita et al. (2001)
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light a scarce propensity to share information and know-how from outside when innovation is
concentrated in a single large firm. In other words, the maximization of knowledge spillovers
requires a competitive innovation process characterized by many active and cooperative
agents. To summarize, this approach considers the reinforcement on connectivity between
different areas and ”place-based” policies as a key-factor in developing and diffusing knowl-
edge spillovers. In this context, makes visible the paths and the extension of the spillover
effects becomes crucial from policy-maker perspective, even if it still constitutes one of the
main ”challenges” to be addressed by causal analysis and policy evaluation.
Indeed, including indirect effects in ”standard” causal framework implies a substantial review
of the SUTVA and a reconsideration of the role covered by interactions between units. This
dissertation aims to recombine in a unique theoretical framework the concepts of spillovers
and policy evaluation. The development of a conceptual link between these separate, even
if closely related, fields requires the identification of a methodological framework able to
play the role of ideal "bridge". As we will explain later, combining spatial econometrics
and hierarchical approaches enables to take into account, simultaneously, the evaluation
of treatment and spillover effects, overcoming the identification problems in presence of
interferences. More in detail, while spatial econometrics allows to model the function for
designing interferences, hierarchical approach enables the check for local heterogeneity,
improving the correctness and efficiency of the estimates.
The remainder of the introductory chapter reviews the literature on spillover and causal
analysis. In section 1.1 we focus on knowledge spillovers and their process of spatial
diffusion; section 1.2 explains the traditional assumption of ”causal analysis”, analysing
how literature debates the inclusion of interferences between units. Section 1.3 focuses
on the problem of identification in presence of interaction and recombine all the different
concepts presented in the previous parts to lay the foundations for the development of a
unique conceptual framework.
1.1 Spillovers
Technological spillovers facilitate the transmission of knowledge and ideas between firms,
researchers and research teams. Literature, usually, classifies knowledge and the related
spillovers in two distinct categories: codified or tacit. The first can be formally articulated
and easily transmitted to others agents without direct social interactions (e.g. by books,
documents, procedures); conversely, tacit knowledge is difficult to articulate and it requires
the occurrence of interactive social networks (face-to-face relations) to be shared.
Fershtman and Gandal (2011) propose an intuitive example to distinguish between the two
different typologies of knowledge spillovers. Considering the case of academic research they
observe as researchers can acquire knowledge without interactions with other authors (i.e.
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by reading and studying their works) or deciding to cooperate with co-authors or colleagues.
Another good example can be found in R&D production process implemented by a firm. In
this case, innovation can be developed with internal skills accumulated by the exposition or
study of outer innovation or technologies or trough an interactive and cooperative process
between individuals based on the discussion and exchange of information and new ideas.
Boschma (2005) proposes a classification of the role covered by different typologies of
proximity (cognitive, organizational, social, institutional and geographical) in diffusing
innovation. However, in this chapter we focus on the review of the literature only on so-
cial and geographical proximity. In this way, we restrict our analysis to tacit knowledge
spillovers, considering the relevance of spatial and social dimension of tacit spillovers. More
specifically, the notion of social proximity originates from the embeddedness literature
(Polanyi, 1966), remarking the embeddedness of economic relations in a social context.
Uzzi (1997) suggests a mixture of both embedded and market relationship at network level
to secure social proximity. However, too high level of social behaviour can be detrimental,
turning the positive effect of the interactions in negative. From policy perspective, this is
mainly due to the continuous evolution of the policies in conditions of uncertainty. On
the other hand, trust between economic actors is negatively influences by weak level of
social proximity. In this way, the lack of confidence between agents affects entrepreneurial
discovery process and, in broader terms, smart policies (Foray and Goenaga, 2013). It is
therefore clear that an optimal level of social proximity is required to maximize the positive
effects of interactions.
Otherwise, geographical proximity refers to spatial or physical distance between economic
entities. Spatially concentrated agents take benefit from positive spatial externalities, i.e.
little distances favour informal contacts and an easier exchange of tacit knowledge. Howells
(2002), considering the pervasiveness of codified knowledge, rethinks this concept for the
case in which its assimilation can still require tacit knowledge and spatial closeness.
The seminal paper of Marshall (1920) provides the first intuition on the positive relation
between spatial proximity, firms interactions and knowledge diffusion, i.e. closely located
agents have easier interactions. More recently, Economic Geography and Endogenous
Growth models provide further evidences on the relevance of spatial proximity in knowl-
edge diffusion. Explaining the differences in regional growth, these approaches argue that
geographically constrained knowledge externalities can give rise to increasing returns and
localized economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999; Baldwin and Forslid,
2005).
A strong empirical evidence in support of the spatial dimension of knowledge externalities is
illustrated by the so-called ”Geography of Innovation”Audretsch and Feldman (2004)5. The
5The literature on the Geography of Innovation is based on the pioneering works of Jaffe (1989), Acs and
Audretsch (1991), Jaffe et al. (1993), Feldman (1994), Audretsch and Feldman (1996, 2004), Anselin et al.
(1997) and Almeida and Kogut (1997).
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aforementioned authors argue that: "Incorporating spatial relationships into the model of
the knowledge production function has redeemed the view that knowledge inputs are linked
to innovative output. While the boundaries of the firm still matter, so do the boundaries of
spatial agglomerations ..... The model of the knowledge production has been found to hold
better for spatial units of observation than for enterprises in isolation of spatial context".
This strand of the literature aims to deepen the relationship between the mechanism that
cause the formation of knowledge spillovers and the degree to which these processes are
geographically localized. The full understanding of this point has relevant policy implication.
Indeed, a theoretical justification to R&D policies is based on the role played by knowledge
spillovers on endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988, 1993; Grossman and Helpman,
1993).
Audretsch and Feldman (2004) and Van Oort (2002) provide evidence in support of the
existence of geographical boundaries for knowledge externalities6. The so-called economy
of agglomeration individuates a further important factor in explaining how proximity influ-
ences innovation. Agglomeration forces tend to concentrate universities, research centres
and their facilities making possible an easier, faster and cheaper flow of information between
agents Doloreux (2002).
de Groot et al. (2008), evaluating the statistical robustness of the evidence that agglom-
eration externalities lead to innovation and regional development, find strong indications
in support of sectoral, temporal and spatial heterogeneity for the effects of specialization,
diversity, and competition on regional and urban development. Nonetheless, the relevance
of proximity in developing knowledge spillovers is acknowledged in literature, there is not
still an explanation on the reason why they occur. Krugman (1991) advises that empirical
measurement of knowledge spillovers could be impossible because " knowledge flows are
invisible, they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked".
To make "visible the invisible" different data is used to approximate knowledge flows,
including indicators related to relationship networks between researchers, e.g. knowledge-
sharing relations (Giuliani and Bell, 2005), joint participation in R&D projects (Balland,
2012), joint patents (Ter Wal, 2013) and patents citations (Agrawal et al., 2006; Breschi
and Lissoni, 2009; Buzard et al., 2015). Roach and Cohen (2013) propose to analyse the
citations reported in the document of the patents to track public-knowledge flows.
The inclusion of network theory in studying proximity allows to take into account all the
possible type of relationships between actors whereby innovation can be transmitted. This
approach considers geographical proximity neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
learning and innovation processes (Boschma, 2005). Giuliani (2007), bearing in mind the
uneven and selective formation of clusters, underlines the partially irrelevance of geographi-
cal co-location in transmitting innovation.
6Breschi and Lissoni (2001) present a critical review on the so called "Localized Knowledge Spillover"
literature.
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Marrocu et al. (2011) confirm the complementarity among the different typologies of prox-
imity. The aforementioned authors, developing a spatial Knowledge Production Function
(KPF) at European regional level, demonstrate the relevance of both technological and
geographical proximities, even if their results can be improved by a finest territorial and
sectoral disaggregation.
Balland et al. (2015) suggest to take into account all short and long distances relationships to
enable a proper clarification of the specific role played by geographical proximity, i.e. they
recommend to limit the analysis on a particular location to better understand the interactions
within and between clusters, rather than adopting a wide scale approach.
Despite evidence in support to micro-founded analysis in the estimation of knowledge
spillovers, empirical literature is still scarce and fragmented. Indeed, mainstream literature,
to the best of our knowledge, proposes a series of studies limited at national (Borowiecki,
2012; Kramar, 2009) or European levels (De Dominicis et al., 2013; Guastella and Van Oort,
2011; Ponds et al., 2010; Paci et al., 2014).
In addition, Charlot et al. (2012), remarking as different industries or technology sector
can show different innovative patterns not fully captured by aggregated analysis, underline
that the use of KPF is not problem-free. Moreover, patent intensity can underestimate the
results for peripheral areas ruling out the occurrence of different forms of innovation, e.g.
incremental or process innovation.
The recent developments of spatial econometrics tools allow to deal, in a direct way, the
spatial dimension of the data and the occurrence of autocorrelation and heterogeneity in
localized dataset (Anselin, 1988). LeSage and Pace (2009), analysing the relation between
space and innovation (Marshall, 1920), provide an ”R&D-based motivation” based on the
idea that knowledge can be considered, at least partly, a public good, i.e. new agents can
make use of it without any costs or at a lower cost that the one requested to produce it.
The assumption of spatially bounded knowledge externalities is at the heart of both geog-
raphy and growth novel theories. This assumption allows to explain both agglomeration
processes and uneven spatial distribution of economic activities. Furthermore, including
directly spatial dependence in the model enable to take into account the strong spatial
polarization of economic activities (Feldman, 1994; Vertova, 2002).
However, the debate on knowledge spillover is not limited to academic analysis, but it has
become a central pillar in policy-maker conducts. Recently, EU policy-makers produces a
series of intervention, included in the multi-annual project Horizon 2020, aimed at devel-
oping network externalities and strengthening more developed areas. Notwithstanding, the
ambitious objectives of the policy makers cannot be properly evaluated by the mainstream
approach in causal analysis. In this sense, a substantial reconsideration of the role played by
interferences between units in causal framework is needed.
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1.2 Mainstream approach in policy evaluation
Mainstream approach in policy evaluation, ruling out the presence of spillovers, focuses
on the assessment of public policies effectiveness. From policy perspective, the concept
of spillover assumes a twofold relevance. On one hand, the spatial extent of knowledge
spillovers constitutes an important factor in shaping regional conditions for innovation and
research. On this topic, part of the literature focuses on the pertinence of geographical
space in diffusing knowledge spillovers through the introduction of concepts such industrial
districts (Porter, 1998), innovation network (Camagni, 1991) and regional innovation systems
(Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011). This idea enables to analyse the supporting role of vehicle
played by cooperative relationship between regional actors in the formation of spillovers.
Policies can stimulate a wider and faster diffusion of knowledge spillovers by the formation
of cooperative behaviour between units, i.e. incentives devoted to the formation of stable
network of firms.
On the other hand, policy-makers implement public policies to promote competitiveness and
growth by the creation of connections between agents. In this way, they implicitly disclose
an additional channel which contributes to the process of development and dissemination
of knowledge spillovers. The estimation of this supplementary channel constitutes a great
challenge in causal analysis, requiring the identification of indirect effect in response to the
policies.
Notwithstanding, under the traditional causal framework it is not yet possible estimate the
additional ”indirect” effect. In other words, causal analysis should not be limited to the
evaluation of policy effectiveness by itself and a wider interpretation of the causal framework
is needed to take into account total, direct and indirect effects. Nevertheless the improvement
in methodological techniques7, the problems of the identification and estimation of causal
7The literature focused in the analysis of randomized experiments started with the seminal works of Fisher
(1925) and Neyman (1923), but the formulation of the dominant approach to the analysis of causal effects in
observational studies was developed only 50 years later (Rubin, 1973a,b, 1974, 1977, 1978). Rubin proposed
the interpretation of causal statement as comparisons of so-called potential outcomes: pairs of outcomes defined
for the same unit given different levels of exposure to the treatment. RubinâA˘Z´s formulation of the problem of
causal inference, labeled the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) by Holland (1986), quickly becomes the standard in
both statistics and econometrics literature. After the precursory works of Rubin the causal analysis framework
has known a period of continuous growth, both from methodological than empirical viewpoint, improving the
possibility of implementing correct and unbiased estimates of the treatment effects. The problem of identification
and estimation of the policy effects is greatly simplified by means of the unconfoundedness or selection on
observables, assumptions that remove all biases between treated and control units, adjusting for differences in
observed covariates, or pretreatment variables (Rubin, 1977). This case is of great practical relevance, with many
studies relying on some form of this assumption. Semi-parametric efficiency bound has been calculated for this
case (Hahn, 1998; Frölich, 2004; Busso et al., 2014; Tan, 2006; Huber et al., 2013) and various semi-parametric
estimators have been proposed (Heckman et al., 1997; Hirano et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2008; Imbens et al.,
2005; Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2009; MaCurdy et al., 2011; Lee, 2013). Without unconfoundedness there
is no general approach to estimate treatment effects. Various methods have been proposed for special cases,
including sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 1995), bounds analysis (Manski,
1990, 2007; Imbens and Manski, 2004), instrumental variables (Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist et al., 1996;
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effects is not yet completely solved and requires a deepen analysis.
In RCM approach, the estimation of the causal effects relies on the validity of the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA; Rubin (1980, 1990)), also known as Individualistic
Treatment Response (ITR) to remark the restriction that it imposes to the form of treatment
response functions (Manski, 2013). SUTVA combines two different assumptions: ”no hidden
versions” of the treatment and the absence of interferences between units, i.e. the treatment
assignment of one unit does not affect the potential outcomes of the others. Defining Y and
D respectively as the potential outcome and the treatment variable and indicating the i-th
units of a population as i = 1, . . . , n we can resume the SUTVA as follows:
• No hidden versions: Yi(d) = Yi when Di = d. In presence of a single version of
the treatment the way in which Di is set equal to d is irrelevant and Yi(d) = Yi is well
defined.
• No interference: Yi(Di, D−i) = Yi(Di). This implies that the potential outcome of
one unit can be considered as a function of only its own state of treatment.
In recent decades, SUTVA assumption has represented the "gold standard" in the identifica-
tion and evaluation of causal effects, even though assuming the presence of a single version
of the treatment or reclaiming the no-interference assumption is not always preferable.
Let us consider, for example, a medical trial in which different levels of medicine are
administered to patients or two firms located in the same area that share the same market but
only one of them is subsidized. This two cases are clear examples in which, respectively, the
no-hidden version and the no interference assumptions are violated. Despite the relevance of
the case in which the no-hidden version of the treatment is violated8, the analysis proposed
in this dissertation focuses only on the violation of the no interference assumption.
Recently, great attention has been paid in causal analysis to the study of the case in which
the no interferences hypothesis is violated. As previously discussed, this is mainly due to a
renovated interest discernible in policy-maker behaviours and a substantial improvement in
methodological techniques. On the last point, the introduction and empowerment of social
network, hierarchical and spatial econometrics theories enables to consider the presence of
social, spatial and economic relation between units. Transposing this intuition on industrial
policies, the novel methodologies allows to take into account the occurrence of interactions
DiPrete and Gangl, 2004), regression discontinuity design (Van der Klaauw, 2002; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee, 2001;
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011; Lee and Lemieux, 2009; McCrary, 2008) or
differenceâA˘S¸inâA˘S¸differences (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Abadie, 2005; Bertrand et al., 2002; Donald and
Lang, 2007; Athey and Imbens, 2006; Puhani, 2012; Reggio and Mora, 2012). Further development has been
introduced in order to consider quantile treatment effects (Firpo, 2007; Frölich and Melly, 2013; Chernozhukov
and Hansen, 2005; Fortin et al., 2011; Frandsen et al., 2012), marginal treatment effects (Carneiro et al., 2010;
Moffitt, 2008), bayesian causal effects (Rubin, 1978; Chen et al., 2009; Heckman et al., 2014; Talbot et al.,
2015) and standard error robust technique (Solon et al., 2015; Cameron et al., 2008).
8The violation of the no-hidden version of the treatment is considered in detail by: VanderWeele and Hernan
(2013) and Schwartz et al. (2012).
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between firms stimulating academic debate on the development of a framework able to
capture the formation of spillovers.
For the above reasons, major efforts are devoted to analyse the causal framework under
interference. This interest can be found in different disciplines9, including economics. The
first step of an introductory analysis of the literature on causal inference in presence of
interferences passes trough the definition of the causal effect of interest. On this regard,
Hudgens and Halloran (2012) define the concepts of direct and indirect effect. The first
corresponds to the response of the individuals to the treatment, whereas we can consider the
indirect impact as the response to the interferences between units.
Considering the definition of indirect effects, why their knowledge is important? How we
can define the interferences? The reply to the first question is not straightforward. Indeed,
the knowledge of indirect effects has a twofold impact on causal analysis. On one hand, it
can ensure unbiased estimates of treatment effects, allowing to decompose the total impact
of the policies in its direct and indirect component. Furthermore, indirect effects played a
central role in the case in which treatment induces interaction.
This intuition, been based on the identification of the interferences between units, produces
a meaningful pattern between the two previous questions. Rosenbaum (2012) argues that
interferences can be " unlimited in extent and impossible to specify in form" making their def-
inition generally intractable. Notwithstanding, it is possible to consider the interactions by a
function of proximity between units. Appropriate measure of proximity can be: geographical
distance, nodal distance in a known social network, metrics of social or economical distance.
In literature, research on drawing inference on causal effects in presence of interference is
not yet common, although some exceptions exist (Verbitsky and Raudenbush, 2004; Sobel,
2006; Rosenbaum, 2012; Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2010; Hudgens and Halloran, 2012;
Kao and Toulis, 2013; De Castris and Pellegrini, 2015).
In spite of this, the majority of the literature is theoretical and/or oriented to randomized
experiments, while applications dealing with violation of the SUTVA in the context of obser-
vational studies are, hitherto, uncommon. Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) and Di Gennaro and
Pellegrini (2016a)10 propose two different approaches to isolate the presence of spillover.
The first, considering untreated firms until a certain cut-off distance as affected, evaluates
the presence of spillovers through a CEM-matching between affected and other controls.
The latter produces differentiate estimates both for treated and untreated on the basis of the
market concentration in which they operate. In this way, is possible to identify the presence
of spillover effects through a comparison between the more concentrated subsidized and the
two controls sub-samples.
9Application of causal inference in presence of interferences can be retrieved in education (Heckman
et al., 1998; Hong and Raudenbush, 2012), infectious disease (Hudgens and Halloran, 2012; Tchetgen and
VanderWeele, 2010) and econometrics (Graham, 2008; Manski, 2013; Sinclair et al., 2012).
10This paper constitutes the second chapter of this dissertation
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Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush (2012), analysing the causal effect of Chicago’s commu-
nity policing program (a community-wide intervention) on neighbourhoods’ crime rates,
model the potential outcomes in any local area as a function of the treatment assignments
of all the other units within the framework of a generalized linear model with spatially
auto-correlated random effects. Sobel (2006), estimating the treatment effect of the Moving
To Opportunity (MTO) program, shows the possible consequences of a violation in the
SUTVA by the definition of different causal ”estimands” of interest. The aforementioned
author, allowing for the presence of interferences between participants, estimates a non-zero
impact on the potential outcome of the untreated (no impact in the case in which the SUTVA
still holds).
Arpino and Mattei (2013), considering interactions between units but assuming the validity
of the SUTVA between different groups (in their case sector of activity), propose a measure
of proximity based on a function of firms’ characteristic, like geographical distance between
firms and firms’ size. To resume, the feature that links these works is the evaluation of
the presence of indirect effects through the comparison of appropriate treated and control
groups. In this way it is possible to approximate the presence of interferences between units
with a predetermined measure of proximity and, relaxing SUTVA hypothesis, identify the
impact of the interactions on causal effect.
An alternative approach to address SUTVA violation is proposed by Manski. Manski (1993)
explains how the impossibility to distinguish between endogenous and contextual interac-
tions and the possibility of correlated effects reveals the so-called "Reflection Problem"11.
Manski refers to endogenous effect as the contemporaneous and reciprocal influences of
peers, whereas the contextual effect includes measures of peers unaffected by current be-
haviour.
Identification problem arises because mean behaviour in the group is itself determined by
the conducts of group members, i.e. data on outcomes do not allow to discriminate if group
behaviour actually affects individuals actions, or group behaviour is simply the aggregation
of individuals conducts. From this perspective, solutions to reflection problem encompass
alternative approaches to the linear-in-mean model (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf,
2001; Moffitt, 2001). The set of proposed alternatives aims to separate peer influences
in endogenous and contextual effects and includes changes in individual behaviour over
the time (lagged vs contemporaneous), non linear function or the introduction of different
feature than the group mean behaviour, like the median.
Further developments on this approach involve, among others, the identification of binary
choice model with social interaction (Brock and Durlauf, 2007), restrictions on the shape
of the response function (Manski (2013) introduces the concepts of Constant Treatment
11Manski (2000) : "The reflection problem is similar to the problem of interpreting the almost simultaneous
movements of a person and his reflection in a mirror. Does the mirror image cause the person’s movements or
reflect them?"
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Response (CTR) and Semi-Monotone Treatment Response (SMTR)) and estimation of
structural interaction effects in a social economics context by a spatial autoregressive model
(Lee, 2006).
Sinclair et al. (2012) suggest a third way to deal with the violation of the no-interference
assumption. In detail, the aforementioned authors, designing a multi-level experiment in
which treatments are randomly assigned to individuals and varying proportions of their
neighbours, find evidence limited to within-household spillovers (no evidence of spillovers
across households). Moreover, they suggest to extend multi-level experiment to a wide
branch of application, including what they define as "policy diffusion" (research and develop-
ment, environmental policies, etc.) and in general to any instances in which the intervention
occurred in one location may have an impact on policy outcome in nearby areas.
However, the growing interest on the cases in which the no-interference assumption is
violated is not yet supported by the development of a unique theoretical and methodological
framework. For these reasons, in the remainder of this dissertation we aim to analyse
and recombine the concept of spillovers and spatial proximity into the causal analysis
framework12.
1.3 Spatial interferences and causal effect: a review
Causal inference in presence of interactions both at individual or cluster level makes not
possible a straightforward adjustment of the RCM approach. Notwithstanding, major efforts
are devoted to analyse a methodological framework which enables to address the challenges
related to the presence of interferences between units. In this section, starting from the
identification problem defined by Manski (1993), we propose a methodological review of
the different approaches developed in literature. In more detail, we will focus on spatial
and hierarchical methodologies to examine the relationship, and the related issue, between
spatial interferences and causal effects.
The so-called ”Reflection Problem” fully summarize the fundamental identification problem
when interferences has been taken into account. Manski (1993), considering the occurrence
of endogenous and exogenous effects and their implications on the overall neighbourhood
effect, highlights the intractable identification of causal impacts. From a methodological
perspective, the "Reflection Problem" takes the form in 1.1:
yi =ρ1E[yi|a] + x′iβ + E[xi|a]γ + vi
vi =ρ2E[vi|a] + ui
(1.1)
12However, in this chapter the analysis is limited to the study of existing literature of causal inference in
presence of interferences. The development of a theoretical and conceptual framework able to estimate both
direct and indirect effects of the policies is explained in next chapters.
1.3 Spatial interferences and causal effect: a review 13
yi is the outcome of interest, xi a vector of exogenous variables, ui and vi are unobservable
error terms, while the variable a indicates the location. This specification allows to distin-
guish three different sources through which neighbours can influence the outcome of a unit:
ρ1 captures endogenous effects ( i.e. the outcome of an individual depends on the outcomes
of other individuals belonging to his neighbourhood), γ indicates the exogenous effects (i.e.
the impact of the mean group characteristics on individual outcome) and ρ2 the correlated
effects of unobserved that affect agents in location a.
Using the law of iterated expectations and substituting E[vi|a] we can rewrite 1.1 as follows:
yi = (ρ1 + ρ2 − ρ1ρ2)E[yi|a] + x′iβ + E[xi|a](γ − ρ2β − ρ2) + ui (1.2)
Equation 1.2 shows that the parameter on E[yi|a] is a mixture of both endogenous and
correlated effects. In other words, ρ1 and ρ2 cannot be identified separately without data on
vi. Taking the expectations of 1.1 and, given the observable characteristics, rearranging the
terms gives the reduced form of 1.1:
yi = x
′
iβ +
ρ1β + γ
1− ρ1 E[x
′
i|a] +
ρ1
1− ρ1E[vi|a] + vi (1.3)
Equation 1.3 demonstrates that only β and the composite parameter ρ1β+γ1−ρ1 are identified,
even when there is not spatial autocorrelation in the unobservables (ρ2 = 0). This assumption
implies that is possible to identify only the overall effect of neighbours’ characteristics.
Spatial econometrics can allows to address, at least partially, the reflection problem (Gibbons
and Overman, 2012). These authors consider a data generating process analogous to 1.1 and
1.3:
yi = ρ1w
′
iy + x
′
iβ + w
′
iXγ + vi (1.4)
yi = x
′
iβ + w
′
iX
γ + βρ1
1− ρ1 +
ρ1
1− ρ1w
′
iv + vi (1.5)
where wi is the spatial weight vector able to generate "neighbourhood averages" of the
estimates of E[· |a] and ρ1 represents the effect of the observed mean neighbourhood
outcome of the sample. In spatial econometrics, the specification in 1.4 (resp. 1.5) is
identified as a Spatial Durbin (SD) (resp. Spatial Lagged of X with spatial autocorrelated
error term (SLX)) model. Repeated substitution of y in 1.5 leads to 1.6:
yi = x
′
iβ+w
′
iX(βρ1+γ)+ρ1w
′
iWX(βρ1+γ)+ρ21w
′
iW
2X(βρ1+γ)+ · · ·+ωi (1.6)
In equation 1.6 all causal parameters are identified, i.e. there are only three parameters to
estimate and an infinitely large number of spatial lags of xi. Nevertheless, spatial econo-
metricians solve the "Reflection Problem" making possible the identification of the causal
effects, critics are moved on the construction of the matrix W. It, representing real-world
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linkages, needs to be defined a-priori. The hypothesis on W creates a clear distinction
between "spatial" and "social" viewpoints. Indeed, social scientists does not agree on an
a-priori knowledge of W. This branch considers that W is almost always never known but
can be considered only as a good approximation of E[· |a]. In other terms, social analysis
requires more structure to address the identification of causal effects in presence of interfer-
ences.
An alternative solution to the reflection problem can be found in hierarchical model (HLM)
(Lee, 2006; Lee et al., 2010). Recently, HLM becomes increasingly popular especially in
economic geography, where the presence of a hierarchical structure (for example: local,
regional and national) can determine multilevel effects on the outcome. Moreover, this
approach allows to check the occurrence of additional spatial effects at different levels of a
nested hierarchy, i.e. the effects of being located within the same region.
Understanding the role played by different form of interactions between variables which
can affect each units of the system and/or the group they belong to has important empirical
implications. Indeed, independently from the presence or not of spatial autocorrelation, the
assumption of independence is usually incorrect when data are extracted from a population
with a grouped structure since this adds a common element to otherwise independent errors,
thereby inducing correlated within group errors.
Following the example in Corrado and Fingleton (2012) is possible to link spatial economet-
rics with HLM approach by the inclusion of general form of network dependence between
individuals belonging to the same group. In this way the aforementioned authors are able to
rewrite a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) as in 1.7:
Y = β0 + ρWY + Xβ1 + Zγ + u + e (1.7)
with Z a N × q matrix of contextual variables defining group characteristics and W a block
matrix such that 1.8.1 and 1.8.2 are verified:
W =Diag(W1, · · · ,Wg) (1.8.1)
Wg =
1
wj
(ιwj ι
′
wj ) (1.8.2)
where ιwj is a wj dimensional column vector of ones. The specifications in 1.7, 1.8.1 and
1.8.2 allow to examine an HLM where individuals within the same group are affected in
the same way by other unit in the group. In this way is possible to focus on within-group
effects assuming that Yj = 1wj
∑wj
i=1 Yij , i.e. all the individuals in group i have same weight.
This implies that interactions between individuals do not spill across group boundaries and
their intensity is not a function of the distance, but depend on the belonging or not to a
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predetermined group. Under this assumption we can rewrite 1.7 as in 1.9:
Yij = β0 + ρYj + β1Xij + γZj + ij + uj (1.9)
Where, following the line of reasoning in Manski (1993), β1 is the effect of individual
characteristics, ρ the strength of endogenous group effect, γ captures exogenous effect,
uj random group effects and ij an individual specific random component. The reflection
problem is expressed simply by taking group means of both sides in 1.9. Resolving for Yj
and assuming Xj = Z , we obtain 1.10:
Yij =
β0
1− ρ +
β1 + γ
1− ρ Xj + β1(Xij −Xj) + eij + u
′
j (1.10)
with u
′
j = uj + ρ
ej+uj
1−ρ . The reduced form in 1.10 implicitly includes the hypothesis of
reflection Xj = Z, even if makes not possible to identify the structural form in 1.7. The
identification problem can be resolved including in the model the presence of inter-group
effect. Assuming Yl be the mean of the responses of neighbours areas and Zl the inter-group
contextual effect, model 1.9 becomes:
Yij = β0 + ρ1Yj + ρ2(Yj − Yl) + β1Xij + γ(Zj − Zl) + ij + uj (1.11)
Corrado and Fingleton (2012) suggest to consider spillover variables in terms of deviations,
both with reference to endogenous inter-group one (Yj − Yl) and contextual, or exogenous,
spillovers (Zj − Zl). Considering the average relationship in 1.11 and resolving for Yj we
are able to obtain:
Yj =
1
1− ρ1 − ρ2 [β0 + β1Xj + γ(Zj − Zl)− ρ2Yl] + u
′
j
u
′
j =
1
1− ρ1 − ρ2 (j + uj)
(1.12)
Substituting 1.12 in 1.11 and rearranging the terms, we can rewrite the model:
Yj =
β0
1− ρ1 − ρ2 + β1(Xij −Xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-group exogenous
+ β11− ρ1 − ρ2Xj︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-group exogenous
− ρ21− ρ1 − ρ2Yl︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-group endogenous
+
γ
1− ρ1 − ρ2 (Zj − Zl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-group contextual
+ij + u
′′
j , with u
′′
j = uj + (ρ1 + ρ2)u
′
j
(1.13)
In this way, we demonstrate that an HLM as in 1.13 can facilitate the identification of the
parameter in 1.9, i.e. the inclusion of inter-group effects allows to estimate causal effect.
The model in 1.13, for ease of interpretation, can be considered as a general form that does
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not consider directly the "Reflection Problem"13.
More general form of interactions, including the ones based on the geographical proximity,
are easily implemented by 1.13 giving structure to inter-group effects, i.e. it is sufficient to
consider the relationship between groups on the basis of a correctly defined block diagonal
matrix W. Corrado and Fingleton (2012) explain how the inclusion of spatial effects avoid
the omitted variable problems that can arise with endogenous spatial lag model and allows
to identify causal effects in presence of interaction.
The focus on multilevel aspects of causal effects, with the combination between spatial
econometrics methods and HLM, constitutes a powerful tools to address the "Reflection
Problem". Moreover, this approach allows to estimate consistently the presence of spillover
that arise with the geographical proximity between units. Some early application of the
use of HLM combined with spatial econometrics to address the problem of interference are
found in Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007) and Burridge et al. (2014).
Vanoutrive and Parenti (2009) try to build a theoretical framework to the use of HLM in a
spatial setting, built on a modified version of the First Law of Geography Tobler (1970)14.
The aforementioned authors, proposing a comparison between HLM and spatial econometric
techniques, discuss the possibility to combine the two approaches. But, as Shakespeare says
in its Merchant of Venice "All that glisters is not gold".
Anselin (2002) admonishes about the presence of side effects in the use of spatial hierarchical
model. Moreover the use of a block diagonal matrix that assigns the same weight to each unit
belonging to considered group15 is reasonable only when the number of units is limited, i.e.
when ng →∞ the contribute of every unit in the group is equal to 0. Another consequence
of the combination between hierarchical model and spatial proximity is the increment of the
complexity of the analysed model. The further complication intrinsic to spatial hierarchical
model may imply a difficult interpretation of the estimated parameter (Langford et al.,
1999).
Gibbons et al. (2014) devote an entire paragraph to explain why cluster randomization
does not solve the reflection problem. They concord on the hypothesis that the presence
of inter-group effects allows to identify causal parameters, as explained in 1.13, even
if it is still not possible to estimate separately the parameter of the structural form 1.11.
Moreover, the implicit assumption under cluster randomization is the presence of endogenous
group membership and/or omitted group specific variables that can affect the outcome.
Both assumptions unveil the occurrence of correlated characteristics between individuals
belonging to same group. The aforementioned authors demonstrate how within-group
correlation, both in terms of observables or unobservable characteristics, have detrimental
13The results in presence of reflection are similar (Corrado and Fingleton, 2012).
14"Everything is related to everything else, but things in the same region are more related than things in
different region" (Vanoutrive and Parenti (2009) on Tobler’s First Law of Geography).
15Remind that every unit in the group has weight equal to: wg = 1ng .
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effects on the effective sample size, i.e. sample size depends on the size of within-group
correlation and the average group size. More in detail, when within group correlation is
equal to 1 the effective sample size corresponds to the number of the groups, whereas if
within group correlation is equal to 0 sample size coincides with the total number of units in
the groups. Every intermediate situation gives standard errors too large or too small if the
inference is based, respectively, on the number of group or individuals. The concerns over
inference are, at least partially, addressed in the case in which researcher has control over
group membership and in presence of random assignment of the units to treated and control
groups16.
Gibbons et al. (2014) propose an in-depth analysis for the case of spatially auto-correlated
unobservables correlated with the observables characteristics. They avoid to consider the
presence of endogenous interaction, focusing on the model:
Y = Xβ +WXXθ +WZZγ +Wvvλ+  (1.14)
The specification in 1.14 allows to distinguish between interaction at individuals level,
between groups and on unobservable characteristics by the inclusion of the three dif-
ferent weight matrices WX , WZ and Wv. In case like the one depicted in 1.14, spa-
tial unobservables can be omitted simply pre-multiplying both sides of the equation for
[I −Wv] ⇐⇒ plim(Wv −WvWv)v = 0. In other words, if the necessary and sufficient
condition is satisfied, spatial unobservables can be removed just applying a spatial difference,
i.e. all variables are transformed subtracting the spatial mean of the unobservables. Under
the assumption WX =WZ =Wv =W , applying the spatial difference of 1.14 produces:
Y −WY = (X −WX)β + ξ, with ξ = −W (1.15)
Specification in 1.15 removes both spatial interaction at individual and group level, making
impossible the identification of the parameters θ and γ. The estimation of the parameter on
the spatial observables is possible only under the strong assumption of different structures
of connection for the observables and unobservables. Duranton et al. (2011) suggests to
combine IV and spatial differencing in the case in which imposing different weight matrices
between observables and unobservables is not preferable, or possible17. This approach is
valid even when the instruments are orthogonal to the spatial unobservables.
Gibbons et al. (2014) consider also the case in which group membership is endogenous.
Under this hypothesis the identification become more and more complex compared to the
previous case. Social network literature proposes different methodologies in order to deal
16This is an alternative assumption to the random assignment of treatment to all members of existing groups.
17The possibility of different connection structure are directly considered in Boundary Discontinuity Design.
This methods corresponds to a spatial case of RDD and the researcher can impose that administrative boundaries
create discontinuities just on the way in which observable characteristics can vary over the space.
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with endogenous group membership, including Bayesian inference, frequentist approach
and a group-level correction term. However, this approaches are not yet explored in a spatial
econometric framework.
1.4 Conclusions
The idea behind this chapter is to recombine the concept of diffusion of knowledge spillovers
under the rigorous framework of policy evaluation. A clarification on the relationship be-
tween the two fields can be partially retrieved with the development of a new wave of
place-based policies, by means of which government aims to develop regional strengths and
the creation of connections between core and peripheral areas. However, the inclusion of the
concept of knowledge spillovers in the standard RCM is not straightforward. Indeed, RCM
model relies on the SUTVA hypothesis. This assumption directly excludes the occurrence
of interactions (also known as interferences) between units.
In recent years many researchers has worked on the construction of an alternative method-
ological framework in which can be possible to estimate both direct than indirect effects,
but the literature is still scarce and fragmented. Different approaches have been developed
and tested, including the comparison of ad-hoc estimand groups, multi-level analysis and al-
ternative hypothesis replacing the SUTVA. The inclusion of interactions makes not possible
the estimation of the causal effects, i.e. Manski (1993) argued that this situation conduct to
the so-called "Reflection Problem", a case in which is not possible to distinguish between
endogenous and contextual effects.
This case, and the related identification problem, is of primary relevance in a wide variety
of fields, including infection diseases, sociology, education, regional and urban economics.
The development of spatial and social methodologies has a twofold relevance in the literary
debate over causal inference. From one hand, spatial and social researchers has assumed
a primary role in causal analysis in presence of spatial and/or social interaction. From the
other hand, these methodologies provides the ”optimal” solution to the problem of causal
identification (see Section 1.3).
In other words, spatial econometrics and network theory are built under the hypothesis that
the outcome of a unit depends not only on its own characteristics, but is a function of the
realized outcome and/or the characteristics of spatial and social neighbours. In this way,
these approaches make clear the connection between the occurrence of interactions and
causal effects. However, this thesis aims to analyse the actual state of art from a spatial
viewpoint.
From this perspective, some preliminary works propose to address the identification problem
through Spatial, Hierarchical or other methodologies that combine both a-spatial and spatial
approach. Notwithstanding, the primary relevance of causal analysis in presence of interfer-
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ences, both from government and academic viewpoints, is not yet completely supported by
the development of an homogeneous framework.
The aim of this chapter, and more broadly of the entire thesis, is the development of pos-
sible solutions to the issues related to the inclusion of interactions between units in causal
inference. In detail, in the remainder of this thesis we propose two distinct DID approaches.
The first, presented in Chapter 2, is framed in the context of observational studies. In this
paper we develop an approach similar to Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014).
These authors propose a partially relaxed version of the SUTVA that take into account the
interactions between the untreated firms; they distinguish non recipient firms considering
their exposition to the subsidized ones and evaluate the spillover effects by a comparison
between the affected ones and the others. The peculiarity of our approach is to assume the
validity of the SUTVA only outside the groups, in relation to their geographical localization,
while we allow the presence of interactions within the groups.
The second proposed approach, explained in Chapters 3 and 4, combines both spatial and
hierarchical model. Following Corrado and Fingleton (2012), this approach allows to decom-
pose the total causal effect in both direct and indirect impacts. The presence of interferences
is modelled by the state of the treatment of the neighbours units and directly included in
the regression model of the SH-DID (Spatial Hierarchical Diff-in-Diffs). This approach
demonstrates the correctness of the ATE even in presence of spatial interferences. However,
our analysis is limited only to first order linear interactions between units, avoiding to
consider the presence of additional causal effects due to higher order neighbours. In addition,
the SH-DID allows to check the spatial dimension of both direct and indirect effects by
changing the spatial weight matrix (see, as an example, Chapter 4).
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Chapter 2
Are Regional Policies effective? An
empirical analysis on the diffusion of
R&D incentives1
In recent years, regional R&D policies have an increasingly relevant role in stimulating
innovation. Moreover, EU strategy aims to foster a ”smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”
in less developed areas by means of innovation policies oriented to the identification and
development of correct areas of specialization. The scope is to promote growth in areas
characterized by comparative advantages and the formation of network externalities (Foray
et al., 2011).
In this context, increasing regional policies efficiency becomes fundamental. In detail, public
instruments have to be efficient in providing public goods, controlling public expenditure
and, in particular, closeness to citizens preferences. The strengthening of regional policies
as tools to enhance innovation and growth has a twofold justification. A stream of literature
highlights how "place-based" policies, supported by institutional reforms and well-informed
local governments, stimulate the commitment of the stakeholders with beneficial effects on
local development and, potentially, on the entire economic system (Barca, 2009; OECD,
2009b; Garcilazo and Oliveira Martins, 2015).
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2011) propose a conceptual framework to justify "place-
based" policies. Under their perspective, regional policies is considered a vehicle for local
development and an instrument for coordinating different type of policies both at national
and regional level. The second theoretical justification is based on the wide heterogeneity
between different regional contexts.
This approach aims to increase the links between developed areas and peripheral regions in
1This Chapter is published as Working Paper of the Doctoral School, Sapienza University of Rome
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order to maximize knowledge spillovers and, in wider terms, innovation2(OECD, 2009a).
Overall, ”place-based” policies tend to emphasize the role played by public administrations.
Their intervention includes, but it is not limited to, the provision of the incentives. Indeed,
policy-makers have to identify the locations where regions have comparative advantages
and recognise the possibility of investments in backward areas (Foray, 2009).
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of a broad range R&D regional policy in Umbria,
a small region located in Central Italy. The development of a ”place-based” approach allows
to assess the ”additional” impact of public policies promoting R&D activities of the firms,
taking into account regional areas of specialization. Our approach focuses on the creation of
spillovers in response to the relative geographical and economic proximity of the firms. We
restrict the analysis only to the effects of regional policies, controlling for the presence of
any national and EU incentives.
The most relevant Italian empirical literature on R&D subsidies provides contradictory
indications. Indeed, while some evaluation studies demonstrate a positive impact of the
incentives, with a greater efficacy limited to the SMEs (Merito et al., 2007; Bronzini et al.,
2008), many others show no additionality (Accetturo and de Blasio, 2008; De Blasio et al.,
2015; Andini and De Blasio, 2016). Moreover, Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) attribute
additionality to a process of inter-temporal substitution that leads companies to anticipate
investment in R&D.
Despite the wide and heterogeneous literature on empirical analyses at national scale3,
works focused on the evaluation of regional innovation policies are still scarce. Gabriele
et al. (2007) and Corsino et al. (2012), analysing the case of Trentino-South Tirol, underline
an increment on the stock of capital with beneficial effects on the access to new market
opportunity, even if not fully captured on factor productivity and profitability.
Fantino and Cannone (2014) provide evidence on the effectiveness of regional policies as
instruments able to foster short term investments, especially for the smallest firms and the
ones with a low credit rating. Bronzini and Iachini (2011), examining R&D incentives in
Emilia-Romagna, show additionality limited to SMEs investments. This result is in line
with Bronzini and Piselli (2016). These authors provides evidences on a significant and
positive impact on the number of patents of small firms. Overall, literature suggests to take
into account firms dimensions. Therefore, in this paper we will provide distinct estimates on
total and SMEs sample.
This chapter introduces two distinct innovations. The main innovations of this work concern
two particular aspects related to the methodological approach and the dataset used. The first
novelty, more methodological, consists in the evaluation of the global effect of the policies.
This operation requires the identification of spillover effects. Therefore, we allow for
2For further information on the topic see Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita et al. (2001) intra alia.
3For further information on evaluation studies at national scale see the surveys in David et al. (2000), Hall
and Van Reenen (2000), Cerulli (2010) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014).
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differentiated interactions between the firms on the basis of their geographical localization
and market concentration by the development of a ”novel” DID approach.
The second crucial point concerns the typology of data used in estimating treatment effects.
Indeed, the regional Core of Evaluation and Verification of Public Investments has made
available CIS micro-data4. Despite the relevant amount of informations included in the CIS
and the easy comparability with the results of studies involving other European countries,
this data is, actually, used only by a limited number of works to evaluate the effects of public
policies (Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Cerulli and Potì, 2008; Marzucchi and Montresor,
2013; Becker and Bizer, 2015).
Nevertheless, this chapter is the first, to the best of our knowledge, which merges the micro-
data of the CIS with balance sheet data and a questionnaire administered by the Regional
Public Administration of Umbria. This operation makes possible to obtain complete and
detailed information on technological structure, R&D process, economic and financial
situation of the firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Second section proposes a detailed
analysis of the data, including a description of the characteristics of the policies and the
firms considered; third section introduces the proposed methodological framework with a
focus on the distinction between traditional and our novel approach. In fourth section we
present the results of the estimates, whereas the last section is devoted to test the validity of
the common trend assumption in order to confer robustness to our results. Conclusions and
policy implications are at the end of the chapter.
2.1 Data Analysis
Labour Market Areas
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of place-based policies in Umbria, a small region
located in Central Italy. A place-based approach requires a preliminary definition of the
correct functional subdivision of regional territory. Considering the limited geographical
dimension of this region we cannot take into account the traditional administrative division
of the territory, like municipalities or provinces. Indeed, taking into account the presence
of relevant demographic and economic agglomeration, we decide to use a more functional
subdivision which enables to identify developed local areas.
4The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) are carried out with two years’ frequency by EU member states
and number of ESS member countries. The CIS is a survey of innovation activity in enterprises. The harmonised
survey is designed to provide information on the innovativeness of sectors by type of enterprises, on the different
types of innovation and on various aspects of the development of an innovation, such as the objectives, the
sources of information, the public funding, the innovation expenditures, etc. The CIS provides statistics broken
down by type of innovators, economic activities and size classes (Eurostat).
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For this reason, the territorial grid that best suits the purposes of this study is based on the
Labour Market Areas5 (from now LMAs). Umbria Region is composed by 14 LMAs, many
of which characterized by a reduced size which does not allow to fully grasp the presence
of externalities. Figure 2.1 highlights two distinct issues. On one hand, it contextualizes
Figure 2.1. Italian Labour Market Areas
Legend: Geographical distribution of Umbria LMAs in the overall Italian context.
the limited regional dimension of Umbria in the overall Italian extension. On the other
hand, looking at regional LMAs distinguish between main (Perugia and Terni) and the other
LMAs. The definition of the more developed local areas is discussed in Table 2.1.
Notwithstanding the limited average dimension of regional LMAs, Table 2.1 allows to
identify the occurrence of two major areas, Perugia and Terni, where population and
5Labour market areas (LMAs, "local labour systems" or Sistemi Locali del Lavoro) are sub-regional
geographical areas where the bulk of the labour force lives and works. They respond to the need for meaningfully
comparable sub-regional labour market areas for the reporting and analysis of statistics. LMAs are defined on a
functional basis, the key criterion being the proportion of commuters who cross the LMA boundary on their way
to work (ISTAT). An important characteristic of the LMA is that the areas are not overlapping and cover the
entire region.
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Table 2.1. Umbria Labour Market Areas
Denomination Population Employed N. of jobs Internal Movements Demand Offer Municipals
ASSISI 57640 20698 20269 14934 0.74 0.72 4
CASCIA 6489 2029 1825 1635 0.90 0.81 4
CASTIGLIONE 24955 8022 7073 5132 0.73 0.64 3
CITTÀ DI CASTELLO 56075 20477 19496 16643 0.85 0.81 4
FOLIGNO 85262 28145 26743 22145 0.83 0.79 6
GUALDO TADINO 31476 9689 8407 6824 0.81 0.70 6
GUBBIO 33874 11095 10038 8883 0.88 0.80 2
NORCIA 7934 2376 2426 1959 0.81 0.82 4
PERUGIA 243653 87072 91796 77890 0.85 0.89 9
SPOLETO 45688 14713 15253 12470 0.82 0.85 6
TODI 37854 11611 10527 8278 0.79 0.71 7
UMBERTIDE 20326 6973 7001 4980 0.71 0.71 3
ORVIETO 42983 13461 12801 11166 0.87 0.83 12
TERNI 178862 57036 55633 52020 0.94 0.91 18
Source: Quality Indicator of Umbria LMAs (Istat, 2011)
Legend: The table shows demographical and economic variables of Umbria LMAs. In detail with Employed and
Number of jobs we indicate respectively the total number of people which lives or works in the LMAs. The internal
movements represents people that lives and works in their own LMAs. The demand (offer) column represents the ratio
between internal movements and Resident Employed (Number of Jobs).
industrial production tend to be more agglomerated. For this reason, the localization in one
of the main LMAs may cover a determinant role in evaluating the effectiveness of regional
policies. Starting from this assumption, we will take into account the location in one of the
main local areas to analyse the role played by industrial concentration on R&D processes
and technological spillovers.
Dataset
Since the 6th Framework Programme (FP6, 2000-2006) Umbria Region has implemented a
series of strategic actions to sustain the creation of business networks and improve their links
with research centres. From 2004 the measures implemented by the Region to encourage
entrepreneurial and territorial competitiveness are included in the so-called ”competitiveness
package”.
In this analysis, we take into account only the incentives directly provided by the Region.
This choice has a twofold relevance. On one hand, it allows to assess the additionality of
"place-based" policies on technological and economic performances of the firms. On the
other hand, this chapter contributes to enhance the lack of studies at regional level.
Moreover, this procedure allows to consider the rankings of three distinct instruments: calls
for investment in technological innovation, Law N. 598/1994; calls for integrated packages
of benefits (Pacchetti Integrati di Agevolazioni, PIA); calls to promote the creation of stable
networks of enterprise (Re.Sta.). The Regional Administration, in the period between 2004
and 2009, provided over e120 millions to the businesses for an aggregate number of 14
calls. Taking into account the presence of more than one ranking in some calls, we have
observed a total amount of 17 announcements.
Notwithstanding, the substantial commitment of regional policy-maker (see Table 2.2) is
not supported by a corresponding involvement of the firms on public funding opportunities.
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Table 2.2. Number of funded projects per announcement
Announcement N. projects funded Overall funding R&D funding
RESTA 2007 15 1457578,00 432330
RESTA RICERCA 2007 69 9519585,91 2992390
RESTA INNO 2007 64 4055531,75 0
RESTA INNO 2008 28 2825527,69 0
RESTA RICERCA 2008 37 3922551,49 2520110
RESTA MODA 2009 32 981168,74 0
RESTA RICERCA 2009 43 5960491,60 3319415
PIA 2004 37 5313662,50 1781310
PIA 2006 47 6637302,39 2038105
PIA 2007 187 27672951,00 4572935
PIA RICERCA 2008 56 10156096,31 6478780
PIA INNO 2009 45 7036431,71 0
L. 598/94 2004 32 6701330,00 6701330
L. 598/94 2006 41 6407565,00 6407565
L. 598/94 2007 74 10021750,00 10021750
L. 598/94 2008 49 6660275,00 6660275
L. 598/94 2009 59 9088240,00 9088240
TOTAL 915 124418039,08 63014535
Source: Core of Statistics and Evaluation of the investment, Regione Umbria.
Legend: This table resumes the overall financial commitment of the Region to the SMEs in order to improve their compet-
itiveness, pointing out the number of funded projects for each announcements. In the last column is reported the incentives
devoted directly to R&D activities.
In fact, even though individual calls have funded all the projects on the list, the analysis of
the participation rate of the firms (number of calls on which each firm has obtained funding)
shows that the majority of them have participated in a single call; which very few are the
companies funded on more than 3 calls.
Regional economic burden to enhance regional competitiveness makes possible the financing
of 915 projects. However, the aim of this chapter is focused only the effectiveness of public
aid directly devoted to foster R&D activities. In this way, we have isolated 480 funded
projects carried out by 253 companies for a total contributions of e63 millions. The 253
financed firms constitutes the factual sample.
Table 2.3. Summary of public policies by objective
Aid for competitiveness Aid for R & D activities
(1) (2)
N. Public announcement 17 14
N. Financed Firms 575 253
N. Financed Projects 915 476
Total contributions 124418039,08 63014535
Source: Core of Statistics and Evaluation of the investment, Regione Umbria
Legend: Resume of policies implemented by Umbria between 2004 and 2009. Column (1) reports the overall amount devoted to
foster territorial competitiveness, Column (2) selects only the firms that receive incentives to R&D activities.
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On the other hand, the counterfactual sample is constituted by 148 companies selected
through the method of the matching pairs. The criteria for selecting control units consider:
the number of employees, turnovers, the economic sector, the business location, profitability
ratios. In this way, we obtain a final dataset composed by 401 firms.
The definition of outcomes able to furnish detailed information on economic and financial
accounts and on the main characteristics of the production process, in particular those related
to innovation and investments in R&D has required the merging of data from different
sources. The economic and financial accounts are considered by the balance sheet data,
provided by the Infocamere archives, for the years between 2004 and 2011. Informations on
technological processes are extracted from the questionnaire4 and the micro-data of the Istat
annual survey (i.e. CIS) on R&D. Besides, CIS data allow to identify pairs of companies
subsidized and non supported on the basis of their propensity to innovate.
To provide evidence on the absence of structural pre-treatment differences between treated
and control we summarize the main economic indicators referred to the baseline year (2005).
Table 2.4. Summary Statistics
Treatment Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Difference in Means
Turnover 0 12996575 2740826 7556794 18400000 4128271
1 8868304 1752325 5408279 12300000 [3102912]
Employees 0 53.5 6.5 40.7 66.3 4.2
1 49.3 5.8 37.8 60.8 [9.1]
Capital assets 0 4576935 1338821 1919747 7234123 1722595
1 2854341 554093 1760314 3948367 [1255488]
Intangible assets 0 753746 470290 -179649 1687140 464352
1 289393 67183 156745 422042 [371326]
Net assets 0 9471459 1746489 6005161 12900000 3741262*
1 5730197 897238 3958649 7501744 [1778125]
ROE 0 0.28 0.35 -0.42 0.98 -0.52
1 0.81 0.38 0.06 1.56 [0.56]
Ebitda 0 949779 219093 514939 1384619 155031
1 794748 128246 541522 1047975 [237002]
ROI 0 2.65 0.66 1.33 3.96 -2.35*
1 5.00 0.81 3.39 6.61 [1.17]
Added Value 0 2435978 385156 1671551 3200405 340545
1 2095433 303563 1496037 2694830 [493224]
Added Value per Employee 0 40635 3272 34142 47129 -14784
1 55420 11745 32228 78611 [15413]
Turnover per Employee 0 231696 46494 139418 323974 -60602
1 292298 97795 99190 485406 [131597]
Legend: This Table resumes economic and financial characteristics for baseline year (2005), differentiated by state of treatment.
Reported statistics are for variables in the numeric format of the data source. The column ”Difference in Means” reports the
difference between the average of control and treatment group, meanwhile the standard errors are indicated in square bracket. The
presence of significant differences between the two samples is evaluated by way of a mean comparison test. The level of statistical
significance of the test is indicated with: * 0,05 , **0,01
Table 2.4 highlights the different economic structure between treated and controls. The firsts
exhibit, in average, better results on the profitability indicators (ROE and ROI). On the other
hand, the untreated show greater values on turnovers, mean number of employees and net
4The questionnaire is administered by the Umbria Center of Statistics and Evaluation of the investments and
provide precise indications on the dynamics of innovation and research processes. In addition this information
allow to take into account the degree of satisfaction of the enterpreneurs on Public Administration actions.
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assets.
To check the presence of significant discrepancies between the two samples we have imple-
mented a mean comparison test. This test confirms the absence of structural differences in
the baseline period. Systematic differences are found in terms of net assets and ROI; this
result, by itself, does not bias the estimates of the difference-in-difference, but requires an
additional robustness check. This step is necessary to evaluate if these discrepancies can
affect the validity of the ”common trend” assumption. In the next section we present the
”standard” DID and our ”novel” approach. This method, taking into account geographical
localization, allows for differentiated effects on the basis of firms concentration.
2.2 Methods
In this chapter, we estimate the effectiveness of regional policies by a Diff-in-Diff estimator
6 under the traditional ”counterfactual” framework. This approach is used to estimate
the effect of a treatment to measure the differences, between the treatment and control
group, of the changes in the outcome variable that occur over time. In other terms, DID
evaluate the impact of a policy by a "double difference", in time (pre-post treatment) and
between subjects (treated and control). However, the validity of this approach requires
un-testable assumptions. Indeed, the results of methodologies based on single difference are
characterized by the "selection bias".
On the other hand, if what differentiates treated and controls does not change over time, the
Diff-in-Diff eliminates the selection bias and produces correct estimates of treatment effect
(parallel trend assumption). In other words, in DID approach differences between the groups
are constant over time; thus, without treatment, there would not be differences in behaviour
between the groups. To guarantee the accuracy of the DID estimate, the composition of
individuals of treated and control groups is assumed to remain unchanged over time.
DID approach is estimated by running a regression analysis of the type:
y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3(D ∗ t) + ε (2.1)
where y denotes the outcome, D and t are dummy variables equal, respectively, to 1 for
the treated units and for the post-treatment period. Assuming the validity of the SUTVA,
we can express the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) in terms of ”double
6Detailed information on the difference in difference approach and its development can be found in:
Ashenfelter and Card (1985); Abadie (2005); Bertrand et al. (2002); Donald and Lang (2007); Athey and Imbens
(2006); Puhani (2012); Reggio and Mora (2012).
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differences”:
ATT =E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 1]− E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 0]−
E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 1]− E[Yi|Di = 0, ti = 0]
(2.2)
As already said, a DID model requires two different time periods. This analysis consider
a 5 year time window, where t=0 refers to 2005 and t=1 to 2010. The choice of the initial
and ending period is related to the years in which regional policies are delivered. Indeed,
the great majority of regional public funding is supplied in 2007 and the pre-post treatment
periods are correctly defined.
Notwithstanding, this chapter raises a further issue. In detail, applying a ”place-based”
approach we aim to identify the occurrence of technological spillovers in response to the
combined action of regional policies and business location. The identification of the spillover
effects, however, requires a partially relaxed version of the SUTVA hypothesis.
Evaluation strategies based on the SUTVA assumes that the response of a particular unit
depends only on its assigned treatment, and not on the treatments received by the others
(Rubin, 1974)7. There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which invoke the validity of
the SUTVA is not plausible. For instance, considering two firms located in the same area
and direct competitors and assuming that only one of them receives public incentives, the
subsidized one can have an impact even on the other (i.e. the untreated one).
Recently, an increasing number of studies focuses on the cases in which the assumptions
at the basis of the SUTVA are violated. Researchers working in this direction shares the
common objectives of finding a methodological approach that includes the presence of
interactions between units8. Nonetheless, research on drawing inference on causal effects
in presence of interferences is not yet common, even if some exceptions exist (Verbitsky
and Raudenbush, 2004; Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2012; Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2010;
Hudgens and Halloran, 2012; Kao and Toulis, 2013; Sinclair et al., 2012; De Castris and
Pellegrini, 2015)9.
However, as discussed in Section 1.2 most of the existing works are theoretical and/or
focused on randomized experiments. In this chapter we develop an approach similar to
the one proposed by Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014). The authors propose a partially relaxed
7For a deepening on the no-interferences assumption see Chapters 1 and 3.
8Manski (1993) explains how the impossibility to distinguish between endogenous and contextual inter-
actions and the possible presence of correlated effects reveals the so-called "Reflection Problem". The author
refers to endogenous effect as the contemporaneous and reciprocal influences of peers, meanwhile the contextual
effect includes measures of peers unaffected by current behaviour. The identification problem arises because
mean behaviour in the group is itself determined by the conduct of group members. Possible approach in order
to take into account the identification problem includes the restrictions on the shape of the response function
(Manski, 2013), estimation of structural interaction effects by means of a spatial autoregressive model (Lee,
2006), binary treatment model with ”endogenous” neighbourhood effects (Cerulli, 2015).
9New advancements in the field of causal inference using the DID approach in a spatial context are: Chagas
et al. (2016),Delgado and Florax (2015) and Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016b)
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version of the SUTVA that take into account the interactions between the untreated firms;
they distinguish non recipient firms considering their exposition to the subsidized ones and
evaluate the spillover effects by a comparison between the affected ones and the others.
The peculiarity of our approach is to take into account geographical localization10 and
considering the presence of interactions within the LMAs, i.e. we assume a limitation on the
validity of the SUTVA limited to firms located in different LMAs. Therefore, our assumption
imposes the restriction that the interferences among subsidized and controls are relevant
only inside the LMAs and not significant outside.
The interferences are introduced in our empirical framework through an additional dummy
variable (LMA), which represent Perugia and Terni LMA, and the interaction term with
treatment and temporal variables. This framework allows to estimate two specific causal
effects:
Average Treatment Effect using the Influenced Controls (ATEIC):
ATEIC =E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 0, LMA = 1]−
E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 0, LMA = 1]
(2.3)
Average Treatment Effect using the Uninfluenced Control (ATEUC):
ATEUC =E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 1, LMA = 1]− E[yi|Di = 1, ti = 0, LMA = 1]−
E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 1, LMA = 0]− E[yi|Di = 0, ti = 0, LMA = 0]
(2.4)
The ATEIC and the ATEUC allow diversified impacts, depending on the choice of the
controls. The ATEUC represents the impact of the subsidies, taking into account the
interferences; the ATEIC is a measure of the error in the estimation of the effects when we
wrongly assume the validity of the SUTVA. However, the difference between ATEUC and
ATEIC provides a measure of the spillover effects in response of the subsidies.
The presence of interferences is modelled comparing the outcome of only the treated units
located in Perugia and Terni and the control groups on the basis of their inclusion or not in
the influence area of the subsidized ones. In this way, we are able to estimate the influences
of geographical localization and market concentration on treatment effects. An immediate
comparison between standard and ”novel” approaches is provided by the following figure.
10Rosenbaum (2012) remarks how the interference can be expressed as a function of proximity between
units. Appropriate measure of proximity can be: geographical distance, nodal distance in a known social
network, metrics of social or economic distance. Nevertheless, we focus only on the geographical dimension of
the interferences between units, many are the studies that consider alternative measures of proximity on the
identification of causal effects. Brock and Durlauf (2007), Cerulli (2015) and Arduini et al. (2014) focus on
social interferences, meanwhile Arpino and Mattei (2013) model interferences as a function of firms size and
geographical distances.
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Left panel represents the standard approach when SUTVA is satisfied. The estimates of the
ATT is implemented by comparing all the treated (T) with the untreated (U). Right panel
shows our novel approach. We select only the subsidized units belonging to the main LMAs
(M), excluding the other subsidized. The ATEIC requires the comparison with the controls
located in M (influenced sample), while the ATEUC selects only the unsubsidised of the
other (O) LMAs (uninfluenced).
2.3 Results
In this section we provide evidence on the effectiveness of public policies on the firms in
Umbria, taking into account the presence of technological spillovers due to the conjunct
action of regional policies and market concentration. This operation requires the empirical
evaluation of the three distinct treatment effects (ATT, ATEIC, ATEUC) presented in the
previous section. In Table 2.5 we show the results of our estimates in term of technological,
economic and financial performances.
The estimates demonstrate the presence of additional effects for innovation and technological
processes, but scarce results on economic and financial performances. First, we assume
the validity of the SUTVA (column ATE in 2.5). The results indicate a major propensity to
R&D process for the treated, both for internal and external research. The higher propensity
on innovation is confirmed by the positive and significant impact on patents, innovation of
product and production process, the development of better logistic systems and the acquisi-
tion of machinery, equipment and software devoted to the innovation process.
In addition, treated firms prefer to operate in international markets, in contra-position of
a regional tendency of the controls. The international openness of the subsidized firms
highlights the improvement of their relative competitiveness in regional market, making it
more dynamic and global. Instead, the limited impact on firms performance is in line with
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Table 2.5. Results
Input Variables at innovation and R&D
ATE ATEIC ATEUC
Graduates (%) 0,57 1,35 -3,19
Mkt Reg (%) -16,98 *** -12,55 -17,10 *
Mkt Nat (%) 5,88 1,47 6,77
Mkt EU (%) 2,38 3,45 5,69
Mkt Non-EU (%) 9,36 *** 8,86 *** 7,09 *
Employes R&D 1,43 3,48 0,05
Graduates R&D (%) -4,54 -21,36 -7,97
R&D intramuros (%) 36,56 *** 46,62 *** 31,29 ***
R&D extramuros (%) 45,68 *** 48,65 *** 54,87 ***
Total current expenditure 72,81 124,08 46,41
Expenditure R&D personnel 54,73 102,92 -10,40
Total expenses extramuros 9,12 -18,49 24,87 *
Total research expenditures -117,70 136,85 -311,81
Output Variables at innovation and R&D
ATE ATEIC ATEUC
Product (%) 26,31 *** 29,87 *** 24,07 ***
Service (%) 2,59 9,58 -3,70
Production Process (%) 22,47 *** 30,68 *** 17,18
Logistic System (%) 16,16 ** 14,44 25,42 *
Machine,equipment,software(%) 20,69 *** 21,82 ** 13,35
Patent (%) 25,66 *** 25,85 ** 28,36 **
Protection design and model(%) 8,28 9,82 13,26
Brand (%) 5,66 7,30 6,16
Copyright (%) 3,42 5,66 5,66
Performance Variables
ATE ATEIC ATEUC
∆ Equity 375580 584633 87697
∆ Net assets 280712 499887 -347362
∆ Net income 20274 -66884 176344
∆ Output Value -1660703 -3036829 -1033338
∆ Personnel Costs -119255 -118806 -523622 ***
∆ Financial charges 27407 30119 9083
∆ Extraordinary charges -21266 1810 -91685
∆ Amortization 215765 *** 287742 ** 188119
∆ Fiscal charges -4982 -45173 58276
∆ Capital assets 32158 844060 -954457
∆ Current assets 299079 -109014 1192512
∆ Added Value 117942 88808 -183487
∆ Ebitda 237197 207614 340135 *
∆ Ebit 81873 -3083 155234
∆ ROI 0,34 -0,98 -1,27
Legend: *** 99 % Significativity, ** 95 % Significativity, * 90 % Significativity
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other regional policy evaluation studies, such as Bronzini and Piselli (2016) and Corsino
et al. (2012). The effects in terms of ATEUC (i.e. when the SUTVA is not valid) are similar
in size and statistical significance.
The comparison between the ATEIC and ATEUC allows to identify technological spillovers
due to regional policies and market concentration. This operation evidences some interesting
differences on technological processes between influenced and uninfluenced units11.
The results shows that firm concentration plays a determinant role in the choice between
internal and external research; the influenced firms prefer to develop external research (both
in term of extramuros research and expenses), while uninfluenced units tend to develop
internal research. The last consideration is confirmed by higher expenses on R&D personnel
for the uninfluenced, even if not statistical significant.
A second insight in comparing ATEIC and ATEUC regards the more intense effects on the
influenced firms, in particular for the production process and product innovation. Inter-
estingly, considering the development of logistic systems, we can observe a positive and
significant effects limited to uninfluenced controls.
The third consideration regards the presence of a negative and significant effects on person-
nel costs for the controls located outside the influence areas of the treated. Recombining the
results of the estimates in a unique framework, we can identify some interesting character-
istics on the dissimilarities on the technological process between firms located inside and
outside the influence area of the treated.
Summarising, the influenced controls tend to externalize their research activity, with a reduc-
tion on the number of employees to R&D and an increment of the extramuros expenses. The
lack of internal activity is reflected in a lower propensity to product and process innovation
and the improvement in their logistic systems in order to follow the entire technological
process.
The uninfluenced, taking into account also the less concentrated market in which they
operate, produce internal R&D and develop independently their innovative products. This
is reflected in a number of firms that invest in production processes and technological raw
materials higher in comparison with the influenced ones. Additional proof is constituted by
the larger R&D personnel expenses, symptomatic of an higher requirement of qualified and
expensive human capital.
In conclusion, we can gather that the influenced tend to create and develop some forms of re-
search network in order to take advantage of the spillover effects due to market concentration
and the proximity with the treated firms.
11Remark that the differences between this two samples depend on the geographical localization of the units.
With the term ”influenced’’ we indicate the unsubsidized located in Perugia and Terni LMAs, meanwhile the
”uninfluenced” are the controls in the other LMAs.
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Additional results
The results presented in the previous section highlight the presence of some technological
spillovers. However, the peculiarities of regional productive structure requires an in-depth
analysis. RUICS (2009) indicates the lack of large firms as one of the main structural
problem in the region, highlighting a reduced average size of the regional enterprises.
Additional estimates limited only to small firms sample are therefore useful.
Table 2.6. Additional Results
Small Firms Manufacturing
Input Variables at innovation and R&D
ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC
Graduates (%) -0,47 -7,43 10,67 4,78
Mkt Reg (%) -14,72 * -22,18 ** -1,25 1,38
Mkt Nat (%) 3,68 11,77 -2,95 0,55
Mkt EU (%) 4,70 5,31 -3,31 -3,03
Mkt Non-EU (%) 8,03 ** 6,31 * 9,51 * 6,05
Employees R&D 6,07 4,32 -0,21 -4,53
Graduates R&D (%) -16,48 -5,84 -23,48 0,38
R&D intramuros (%) 53,38 *** 35,33 *** 39,00 *** 20,82 *
R&D extramuros (%) 54,73 *** 59,51 *** 34,60 ** 52,79 ***
Total current expenditure -46,87 98,47 ** 163,34 39,02
Expenditure R&D personnel -30,41 59,55 ** 124,67 -22,75
Total expenses extramuros -20,89 50,11 * 25,42 20,15
Total research expenditures -49,97 119,54 ** 189,00 -385,54
Output Variables at innovation and R&D
ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC
Product (%) 32,37 *** 33,48 *** 14,37 5,28
Service (%) -2,17 -8,42 15,84 11,29
Production Process (%) 30,00 ** 18,89 ** 43,64 *** 16,36
Logistic System (%) 20,00 26,94 * 27,88 * 36,97 **
Machine,equipment,software(%) 20,29 * 18,21 * 35,78 *** 8,50
Patent (%) 26,81 ** 30,98 ** 20,53 29,62 *
Protection design and model(%) 8,45 13,32 7,04 7,04
Brand (%) 4,44 6,53 -3,03 -12,12
Copyright (%) 6,67 6,67 6,67 6,67
Performance Variables
ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC
∆ Equity 20325 106560 1362941 140474
∆ Net assets 467031 * -30603 290191 -395782
∆ Net income 34873 -82839 -429942 333369
∆ Output Value -101256 -366314 1757665 -1193062
∆ Personnel Costs -78578 -53972 95516 -703631 **
∆ Financial charges -16428 31950 109224 -17425
∆ Extraordinary charges -37108 * -24638 118571 -102272
∆ Amortization 70674 * 88316 ** 387028 * 204118
∆ Fiscal charges -18648 3462 -119560 91971
∆ Capital assets 526037 533155 1663113 -1678038 *
∆ Current assets -1068861 563622 3214236 * -34167
∆ Added Value -45215 -37722 160838 -193869
∆ Ebitda 33363 16250 65322 509762 *
∆ Ebit -37431 -132708 -108669 332410
∆ ROI -0,93 -1,60 -2,32 -1,24
Legend: *** 99 % Significativity, ** 95 % Significativity, * 90 % Significativity
With the term ”Small firms” we consider only the enterprises with a number of employees between 10 and 49. The definition of
manufacturing sector follows the ATECO 2007 classification (Nace rev.2)
Small firms estimates highlight an higher additional impact of the regional policies, confirm-
ing the empirical founding of the previous literature (see Bronzini and Piselli (2016) inter
alia). Interesting results are found in terms of a lower openness to national and international
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markets of the controls and a strong additionality on the number of treated that develop both
internal and external research.
The effects on economic variables are still limited, even though a positive and significant
impact on net assets. In addition the results provide evidence in favour of the development
of spillover effects. The most significant effect is related to the expenditure component
on the innovation processes. The wide ATEUC reflects the fact that small firms located
outside the main LMAs invest less than the influenced controls, having similar results on
innovation product. The estimates suggest the preference for the uninfluenced to develop
internal research, confirmed also by coherent results on the production process and logistic
systems in comparison with the ATEIC.
The results are heterogeneous by sectors. We estimate the effects in the sub-sample of the
manufacturing12. The different research structure between influenced and uninfluenced
controls is more clear in this sector. Instead, the evidence on the additionality of public
policies on technological process are weak, even if the treated have a positive and significant
effects on production process, logistic systems and the acquisition of machinery.
The impact on the influenced controls has a greater intensity. Some limited spillover effects
are found for the Ebitda. In addition the personnel costs present a negative and significant
ATEUC; results consistent with the one referred to the employees on R&D. The estimates
on the manufacturing highlight how the uninfluenced controls present, on the whole, better
technological and financial performances in comparison with the influenced untreated. This
consideration suggests how being located in a more concentrated market produces negative
externalities on the performances of the controls in the manufacturing sector.
2.4 Robustness check
A correct implementation of the DID approach requires that the data satisfy the ”common”
trend assumption; i.e. the trend in the outcome variable for both treatment and control
groups during the pre-treatment period are similar. Thus, in absence of treatment, there
would not be differences in behaviour between the two groups and the deviation on temporal
trend after the treatment identifies the treatment effects.
This assumption plays a fundamental role in the implementation of the Difference in
Difference estimators. On one hand, it ensures unbiased estimates. Conversely, usually its
validity is difficult to test and it assumed to be true a-priori. In this chapter we check the
validity hypothesizing that the growth rate for the outcome of treated and controls follows
12The definition of manufacturing are based on the Italian classification of the economic activity (ATECO
2007). ATECO 2007 recalls the European definition and guidelines indicated in the NACE rev.2; in this way the
data are comparable both at EU and extra-EU level. In detail, Manufacturing corresponds to the entire Section C
of the classifications.
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parallel paths during the pre-treatment period. In this way we are able to estimate the
possible presence of different temporal trend between the groups.
This test consists in the implementation of the standard and novel DID approach in the pre-
treatment period, checking for the presence of significant results. Common trend assumption
is satisfied if there are not significant differences in pre-treatment trends.
Table 2.7. Robustness Check
ATE ATEIC ATEUC
g Equity 0,30 0,05 -0,01
g Net assets 0,05 0,06 13,67
g Net income -17,78 -41,81 -45,22
g Output Value 1,07 0,18 0,36
g Personnel Costs 6,81 13,67 13,61
g Financial charges 0,82 0,49 0,45
g Extraordinary charges 93,73 8,88 -70,13
g Amortization -30,76 0,10 -12,04
g Fiscal charges 0,17 0,72 -0,31
g Capital assets 0,14 0,19 0,15
g Current assets -0,07 -0,05 -0,07
g Added Value 4,67 8,13 12,01
g Ebitda 18,95 6,88 6,95
g Ebit 16,82 35,95 36,46
g ROI 3,63 7,63 6,59
*** 99 % Significativity, ** 95 % Significativity, * 90 % Significativity.
Legend: The reported statistics are expressed in terms of growth rate between 2004 and 2005. The estimates demon-
strate the absence of significant differences in time trend before the treatment.
Table 2.7 shows the lack of meaningful differences in the economic performances for all
the outcome variables used in the estimation of the ATT, ATEIC and the ATEUC during
pre-treatment period. This results confirm the validity of the ”common trend” assumption.
2.5 Conclusions
Modern economic theory places a strong emphasis on the role of innovation and technical
change in generating growth. In this paper we provide evidence on the effectiveness of the
regional ”Competitiveness Package” in Umbria. Starting from a ”traditional” approach, we
introduce the possibility of interactions between firms, on the basis of their geographical
localization and market concentration. Our approach allows to differentiate the effects
in consideration of territorial strength, in order to identify the presence of technological
spillovers.
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The results provide evidence in favour of the effectiveness of regional policies. The subsi-
dized firms have additional and significant effects in the improvement of their technological
capabilities, both in terms of input and output of the R&D processes; while there are no
impacts on firms performances. The lack of short-term effects on the economic and financial
accounts can be explained, at least partially, by regional policies.
In fact, their main objective is to foster research and innovation of the firms. This produces
a change in firms behaviour which stimulate technological production and R&D process.
In this way, seems reasonable to expect a long temporal lag between the production of the
innovation and economic and financial benefits on the activities of the firms. However, the
analysis of the effects on medium and long period of the incentives requires the availability
of data referred to broader time window. This will be an interesting extension for further
research.
In addition, the impact is heterogeneous across firms. The estimates highlight the relevance
of geographical concentration, not only with beneficial effect on the innovative variables.
In fact we have found some empirical evidence on the different structure of the process of
innovation. Firms that are not treated but influenced by the policy tend to prefer external
research, increasing their link with the other territorial components.
Instead, the uninfluenced ones prefer to develop internal research. This is evidenced by a
major requirement of specialized employees, with detrimental effects on personnel costs.
These results show how the localization in the influence area of the treated favour the
diffusion of technological spillovers. In detail, the novel approach proposed in this chapter
permits to identify the development of spillover effects through the comparison between
ATEIC and ATEUC. We find evidence of spillovers in terms of total expenses extramuros,
number of patents, development of logistic systems and the Ebitda.
The effectiveness of public policies is not only influenced by geographical location. As
expected, also firms size is important. Small firms present a bigger additional impact, both
in terms of policy effectiveness and for the technological spillovers. The most evident
results are found considering the development of spillover effects for R&D expenditures.
Indeed, the uninfluenced controls tend to spend less for technological input variables, both
for personnel and research costs.
Furthermore, the estimates referred to the manufacturing show the presence of different
technological paths compared with the previous cases. In fact, the limited effects on the
innovation of product are counterbalanced by the significant impact on the development of
new production process and on the acquisition of machinery and equipment. Besides, it is
important to remark the development of negative externalities on the influenced controls.
This shows how process innovation, in this sector, is affected by market concentration and
does not necessarily imply the development of research network.
In addition, a well-informed public administration can be considered as a key issues for the
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redefinition of public policies. The analysis of the questionnaires proposed by the Umbria
Region to the firms provide us some insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the
instruments from the entrepreneurs viewpoint.
Table 2.8. Degree of satisfaction of the firms
Satisfaction’s degree of enterprises
Weakness Strengths
Approval times Allocation Procedure
Dispensing times Mode / entity of the incentive
Certainty obtaining incentive Knowledge of procedure by P.A.
Simplicity of the procedure Quality relationship with P.A.
Source: Our elaboration of the questionnaires.
Legend: This table resumes the degree of satisfaction of the enterprises on the procedure behind the admin-
istration of public policies and, in general, on the behaviour of the Public Administration
Table 2.8 shows how the entrepreneurs are particularly satisfied with the behaviours of
the public administration, but require shorter approval times and a major simplicity of the
procedure. In conclusion the results seem to confirm empirically a strict local linkage and the
presence of significant local technological spillovers as a response of the conjunct influence
of the regional policies and the geographical concentration.
This concept constitutes the ”core” of smart specialization policies in Europe and our novel
approach can be considered a powerful tool in order to provide evidence on the presence
and development of technological spillovers.
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Chapter 3
Policy Evaluation in presence of
interferences: a spatial hierarchical
DID approach1
The mainstream approach in policy evaluation focuses on the assessment of public policies
effectiveness ruling out the presence of interferences and, consequently, the occurrence of
spillovers effects. This is quite surprising, since the main scope of policy intervention is to
stimulate positive spillovers among agents. A typical case is the public support to R&D. In
this context, policies aim to stimulate a wider and faster diffusion of knowledge spillovers.
Knowledge spillovers have a twofold relevance in regional sciences perspective.
On one hand, the spatial extent of knowledge spillovers constitutes an important factor in
modelling regional conditions for innovation and R&D. Part of the literature remarks the
relevance of geographical space on the diffusion of knowledge spillovers by the formation
of cooperative relationship between regional actors2.
On the other hand, policies enhancing knowledge spillovers favour the formation of rela-
tionships between units through, for example, incentives devoted to the formation of stable
network of firms. These policies reveal the development of an additional channel to the
process of formation and dissemination of knowledge spillovers.
The estimation of the differentiated channels to facilitate the formation of knowledge
spillovers is a great challenge for policy evaluator, inasmuch it requires to distinguish
between total and indirect effects in response to the treatment. However, the traditional
1This Chapter is published as Working Paper of the Centre for Research on the Economics of Institutions,
University of Roma Tre
2Regional scientists introduces concepts like industrial districts (Porter, 1998), innovation network (Cam-
agni, 1991) and regional innovation systems (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011) to analyse the connection between
geographical proximity and cooperative behaviours in the development of knowledge spillovers.
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approach in policy evaluation does not allow to evaluate the additional indirect effect. Actu-
ally, the aim of the policy maker is not limited to the development of knowledge spillovers,
but, in wider terms, to to enhance innovation and growth by stimulating direct and indirect
effects.
Hudgens and Halloran (2012) propose a definition of direct and indirect effects. The first is
the response of the individuals to a treatment, while the latter represents the response to the
interferences between units. The knowledge of the indirect impact of the policies is crucial
to ensure unbiased estimation of treatment effects. Moreover, it played a fundamental role
in the case in which treatment induces interactions.
Rosenbaum (2012) argues that interferences may be "unlimited in extent and impossible
to specify in form", making the problem of the specification of the interactions difficult to
solve. However, it is possible to consider interferences by a function of proximity between
units. Appropriate measure of proximity are the geographical distance, the nodal distance in
a known social network or metrics of socio-economic distance.
Research on drawing inference on causal effects in presence of interferences is not yet
common, although some exceptions exist (Verbitsky and Raudenbush, 2004; Sobel, 2006;
Rosenbaum, 2012; Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2010; Hudgens and Halloran, 2012; Kao and
Toulis, 2013; Sinclair et al., 2012; De Castris and Pellegrini, 2015; Cerulli, 2015). However
most of the existing works are theoretical and/or focalized on randomized experiments.
Applications in the context of observational studies which address SUTVA violations are
still rare.
Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) and Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016a) propose two different
approaches to isolate the presence of spillovers. The first considers the untreated until a
certain cut-off distance as affected and evaluate the presence of spillovers through a CEM-
matching between the affected and the other controls. The latter identifies the occurrence of
spillover effects by a comparison between treated and controls on the basis of the market
concentration in which they operate3.
Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush (2012), analysing the causal effect of Chicago’s commu-
nity policing program (a community-wide intervention) on neighbourhoods’ crime rates,
model the potential outcomes in any local area as a function of the treatment assignments
of all the other units within the framework of a generalized linear model with spatially
auto-correlated random effects.
Sobel (2006), estimating the treatment effect of the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) program,
shows the possible consequences of a violation in the SUTVA by the definition of different
causal ”estimands” of interest. The aforementioned author, allowing for the presence of
interferences between participants, estimates a non-zero impact on the potential outcome of
the untreated (no impact in the case in which the SUTVA still holds).
3This method is presented in Chapter 2.
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Arpino and Mattei (2013), considering interactions between units but assuming the validity
of the SUTVA between different groups (in their case sector of activity), propose a measure
of proximity based on a function of firms’ characteristic, like geographical distance between
firms and firms’ size.
To resume, the feature that links these works is the evaluation of the presence of indirect
effects through the comparison of appropriate treated and control groups. In this way it is
possible to approximate the presence of interferences between units with a predetermined
measure of proximity and, relaxing SUTVA hypothesis, identify the impact of the interac-
tions on causal effect.
A different approach is proposed in the works of Manski. Manski (1993) explains how the
impossibility to distinguish between endogenous and contextual interactions and the pres-
ence of correlated effects reveals the so-called "Reflection Problem". The above mentioned
author refers to endogenous effect as the contemporaneous and reciprocal influences of
peers, whereas contextual effect includes measures of peers unaffected by current behaviour.
The identification problem arises because mean conduct in the group is itself determined
by the behaviours of group members, i.e. data on outcomes do not allow to discriminate
if group behaviour actually affects individuals conducts or it is simply the aggregation of
individual behaviours.
Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Moffitt (2001) propose alternatives to the
linear-in-mean model to suggest possible solutions to the identification problem. The set
of alternatives aims to separate peer influences in endogenous and contextual effects and
includes variation in individual behaviour over the time (lagged vs contemporaneous), non
linear function or the inclusion of the group median behaviour as alternative to the mean.
Further developments on this approach include the identification of binary choice model
with social interaction (Brock and Durlauf, 2007), restrictions on the shape of the response
function (Manski, 2013)4 and estimation of structural interaction effects in a social eco-
nomics context by a spatial autoregressive model (Lee, 2006).
Gibbons and Overman (2012) demonstrate that spatial econometrics techniques can solve
the identification problem. Sinclair et al. (2012) suggest a third method to address the
violation of the no-interference assumption. In detail, they design a multi-level experiment
in which treatments are randomly assigned to individuals and, varying proportions of the
neighbours, they find evidence of within-household spillovers (no evidence of spillovers
across households).
The aforementioned authors suggest that multi-level experiment can be extended to a wide
branch of application, including what they define as "policy diffusion" (research and de-
velopment, environmental policies, etc.) and in general to any circumstances in which the
intervention occurred in one location influences the outcome in nearby areas.
4Manski introduces the concept of Constant Treatment Response (CTR) and Semi-Monotone Treatment
Response (SMTR) as alternatives to SUTVA hypothesis.
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Corrado and Fingleton (2012), analysing a spatial autocorrelated model, isolate indirect
effects by differentiating the model for the mean at neighbourhood level5. Literature analysis
shows that the growing interest on empirical research in presence of interactions has not yet
led to the development of a unique theoretical and methodological framework. This chapter
aims to address identification problem in presence of interferences by proposing a novel
approach that allows to recombine direct and indirect effects in the ATE.
3.1 Potential Outcome Model with interferences
The idea behind the definition of a novel framework relies on the ”traditional” Potential
Outcome Model. Notwithstanding, in our novel framework interferences are not considered
as a nuisance term, assuming a fundamental role in the identification of the causal effects.
yi = Diy1 + (1−Di)y0 =
y
1 if D = 1
y0 if D = 0
(3.1)
where D indicates the state of treatment. Rosenbaum (2012) argues that in presence of
interferences the number of potential outcome is not equal to 2. In detail, it depends on
the sample size and the number of treated units, making intractable their identification.
However, to impose a restriction on the extension of the interferences allows to overcome
the identification problem. In this paper we impose a spatial restriction on the extension of
the interactions by proposing a proximity function based on the state of treatment of the
neighbours.
We still assume the validity of the potential outcome framework, while the presence of
interferences between units make possible the decomposition of the overall causal impact in
direct and indirect effects. We start from a different version of the POM (eq. 3.2) which
corresponds to the ”traditional” potential outcome to whom we add and subtract the equation
in 3.1 multiplied by Dj . This term, derived applying a spatial lag of the treatment variable,
represents neighbours’ state of treatment:
y = Dy1 + (1−D)y0 +Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)−Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0) (3.2)
3.2 can be rearranged and write as:
y = (1−Dj)(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect without interactions
+Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of the interactions
(3.3)
5Gibbons et al. (2014) propose an alternative approach for identifying causal parameters in presence of
interactions within clusters, based on a process of spatial differencing.
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Equation 3.3 permits to distinguish between direct and indirect effects. In detail, the first
term in 3.3 represents the direct effect (i.e. the total effect purified by the impact of the
interferences), while the latter constitutes the indirect effect. Note that the indirect effects
are determined by the first order’s neighbour6. In this way, we can decompose the ATE as
the sum of direct and indirect effects, as reported in 3.4.
ATE = ADTE +AITE = (1−Dj)ATE +DjATE (3.4)
This idea constitutes the focal point of the Difference-in-Differences approach followed in
the remainder of the chapter.
3.2 Introducing the Interferences in DID approach
The ”traditional” DID model allows to evaluate the ATE as the parameter β3 of the following
equation:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2T + β3DT (3.5)
or expressed in terms of expectations as in 3.6:
aS = E[Y |D = 1, T = 1] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3
bS = E[Y |D = 1, T = 0] = β0 + β1
cS = E[Y |D = 0, T = 1] = β0 + β2
dS = E[Y |D = 0, T = 0] = β0
ATE = (aS − bS)− (cS−dS) = β3
(3.6)
The formulations in 3.5 and 3.6 provide correct estimates of the treatment effect, even if it
exclude the presence of inferences between units. To include this hypothesis a substantial
review of the Diff-in-Diffs approach is required. The objective of this paper is to adapt the
intuition in 3.2 in the regression model expressed in 3.5.
In other words we include an additional part in the ”standard” DID estimator multiplied by
the state of treatment of the neighbours units in order to model the presence of interactions.
This allows to obtain the specification in 3.7:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt (3.7)
Using the specification in 3.7 we are able to estimate simultaneously both total, direct and
6Different typologies of neighbours can be considering on the basis of the adopted spatial framework.
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indirect causal effects. Applying the ”standard” Diff-in-Diffs approach to 3.7 provides
unbiased estimates of the ATE, even if, in this case, we are able to decompose the ATE to
identify and isolate the quota of impact attributable to the interferences. In this way the
formulation of the ATE becomes:
ATE = β3 + β4(D1j −D0j ) + β6D1j (3.8)
The term D1j (resp. D
0
j ) indicates the average share of treated neighbours for subsidized
(resp. control) units. As already said, the ATE in 3.8 is obtained applying a double difference
estimator conditioning for own state of treatment and time. The identification of direct and
indirect effects requires an introductory presentation of all the possible results obtainable
conditioning with respect to time, own and neighbours’ state of treatment.
The cases in which Dj 6= 0 represents the situations in which we assume that treatment
induces interactions between units, i.e. in the neighbourhood of the considered unit is
located at least one treated unit. From 3.7 we derive the impact of direct and indirect causal
effects:
a = E[Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4D1j + β5D1j + β6D1j
b = E[Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj = 0] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3
c = E[Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β1 + β5D1j
d = E[Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj = 0] = β0 + β1
e = E[Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β2 + β4D0j
f = E[Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj = 0] = β0 + β2
g = E[Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj 6= 0] = β0
h = E[Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj = 0] = β0
(3.9)
The direct effect (ADTE) is estimated by a double differences for the units without treated
in their neighbourhood, i.e. the ADTE represents the situation in which there are not
interactions due to the treatment. In this way we obtain the ADTE as in 3.10:
ADTE = b− d− f + h = β3 (3.10)
Furthermore, model specification allows for differentiated indirect effect both on treated and
controls. The indirect effects are obtained through a double difference estimator on time and
neighbours state of treatment, assuming own state of treatment constant.
AITET = a− c− b+ d = β4D1j + β6D1j (3.11)
AITENT = e− g − f + h = β4D0j (3.12)
3.11 and 3.12 represent respectively the AITET (Average Indirect Treatment Effects on the
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Treated) and the AITENT (Average Indirect Treatment Effects on the Controls) 7. In this
chapter we analyse the correctness of the intuition behind the DID model with interferences.
In the next section we present the results of our simulations.
3.3 Montecarlo Simulation
The novel approach developed in this chapter allows to overcome the identification problems
related to the inclusion of interferences between units in causal analysis. Notwithstanding,
the aim of this paragraph is to determine an appropriate estimation procedure able to provide
unbiased and efficient estimates of the causal effects. For these reasons, two different
Montecarlo Simulations were required. This procedure takes into account the behaviour of
the causal effects when we increase both the number of replications (100 and 250) and the
sample size (225, 400 and 625 units). To address the identification problems in presence of
interferences we propose a two-stage analysis.
In the first stage, we open up to the possibility of spatial interactions under the assumption
of uniform spatial distribution of the units (i.e. firms are located in a regular grid). In this
step of our analysis we compare the performances of both a linear estimator and a spatial
error model.
In the second stage we consider a spatial agglomerated distribution of the units. Moreover,
we take into account possible differences between areas through the inclusion of a random
neighbourhood effect. This stratified approach makes possible the introduction of an
alternative hierarchical model. Under this framework we are able to simulate a ”real” world
case which allows to take into account the existence of both clustered and undeveloped
areas. In this stage, we compare the results of a linear, a spatial and an additional spatial
hierarchical procedure.
3.3.1 Spatial Heterogeneity
The first case introduces spatial heterogeneity on a uniform spatial distribution of the units.
This assumption has a twofold impact on our analysis. On one hand, imposing the restriction
on the distribution of the units allows to consider the impact of spatial interferences on causal
effects. On the other hand, the presence of spatial heterogeneity enables the inclusion of a
spatial error model. In this stage of our analysis we evaluate the unbiasedness of the DID
model with interferences by a comparison between a linear (DID) and a spatial (Spat-DID)
approach8.
7The proofs of total, direct and indirect treatment effects are in Appendix A.
8It is noteworthy to recall that Gibbons and Overman (2012) demonstrate that spatial econometrics allows
to address identification problem in presence of interferences.
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Furthermore, the inclusion of spatial heterogeneity in the analysis ensure the unbiasedness
of both linear and spatial models9. Under these hypothesis, we simulate the following DGP:
yi = α+ βX + ui
ui = λWui + i
β = (β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6) = (1, 1, 1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
X = (D, t,Dt,Djt,DjD,DjDt)
λ = 0.5
Dj =WD with W first order queen contiguity matrix
Dj = d ∈ [0, 1]
i ∼ N(0, 1)
where the vector X represents the covariates of the DID model in presence of interferences,
the error term ui presents spatial autocorrelation depending on the value of the parameter λ,
Dj indicates the state of treatment of the neighbours units and it can assume values between
0 and 1 (i.e. W is a row-standardized spatial matrix). More in detail, the value of Dj for
unit i is obtained as:
iDj =WDi =
d ∈ (0, 1] when
∑n
i=1wiDi = d
0 when∑ni=1wiDi = 0
This case includes the presence of spatial correlated treatment variable obtained by the
following spatial decay function: h(x) = e−φ∗distance, with φ = 1.25. Therefore, the above
DGP produces a spatial distribution of the variables as reported in Figure 3.1.
Top-left panel shows the spatial distribution of the treatment variable on a regular lattice.
Top-right panel exhibits the different level of interferences (i.e. quota of neighbours treated)
for each units, while bottom-right (resp. left) panel illustrates the distribution of the response
variable at time 0 (resp. 1).
The results of the simulation of the ”traditional” DID model shows an upward bias in the
estimation of the ATE. In other words, including the presence of interferences the ATE
become a function of both direct and indirect effects. Consequently, the amplitude and sign
of the bias in the ATE follows are in line with the sign and amplitude of direct and indirect
causal effects. However, taking into account the interaction between units through the novel
methodology we are able to produce an unbiased decomposition of the ATE in both its direct
and indirect components 10.
9”A spatial error model is a special case of a regression with a non-spherical error term, in which the
off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix express the structure of spatial dependence. Consequently,
OLS remains unbiased, but it is no longer efficient and the classical estimators for standard errors will be
biased”(Anselin, 2007)
10See Appendix B.
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Figure 3.1. Spatial Distribution with Spatial Heterogeneity
Table 3.1. Results of ”Traditional” DID with spatial heterogeneity
DID Spat-DID
n m Result S.Error Result S.Error True
Cons
225
100
1.1021 0.1167 1.0497 1.2869 1
D 1.0412 0.2113 1.0288 0.0725 1
t 1.0266 0.1650 1.0402 1.8200 1
ATE 1.0525 0.2988 1.0126 0.1026 1
Cons
400
1.0672 0.0916 1.0936 1.1837 1
D 1.0708 0.1649 1.0321 0.0541 1
t 1.0266 0.1295 1.0398 1.6741 1
ATE 1.0536 0.2332 1.0128 0.0765 1
Cons
625
0.9298 0.0752 0.9190 1.0857 1
D 1.0586 0.1357 1.0305 0.0433 1
t 1.0267 0.1064 1.0409 1.5354 1
ATE 1.0532 0.1918 1.0128 0.0612 1
Cons
225
250
0.9798 0.1139 1.0072 1.1930 1
D 1.0279 0.2063 1.0334 0.0729 1
t 1.0266 0.1611 1.0395 1.6871 1
ATE 1.0524 0.2918 1.0123 0.1031 1
Cons
400
0.9142 0.0951 0.9468 1.2353 1
D 1.0396 0.1715 1.0257 0.0540 1
t 1.0267 0.1345 1.0410 1.7470 1
ATE 1.0535 0.2425 1.0126 0.0763 1
Cons
625
0.9262 0.0768 0.9243 1.0633 1
D 1.0261 0.1384 1.0299 0.0431 1
t 1.0268 0.1086 1.0397 1.5037 1
ATE 1.0533 0.1957 1.0129 0.0610 1
Legend: Table 3.1 presents the results of Montecarlo Simulation in presence of spatial heterogeneity. n represents the number of units (225, 400 and 625), m the
number of replications (100 and 225), the columns DID (resp. Spat-DID) display the results of linear (resp. spatial) model, while the last column indicates the
true value of the parameter.
Table 3.2. Bias/Efficiency DID with spatial heterogeneity
BIAS RMSE DID-Estimate
n m OLS Spat-DID OLS Spat-DID OLS Spat-DID
ATE
225
100
0.0525 0.0126 1.4514 0.4867 0.0000 0.0399
400 0.0536 0.0128 1.5187 0.4835 0.0000 0.0408
625 0.0532 0.0128 1.5622 0.4838 0.0000 0.0404
ATE
225
250
0.0524 0.0123 1.4169 0.4888 0.0000 0.0401
400 0.0535 0.0126 1.5778 0.4827 0.0000 0.0409
625 0.0533 0.0129 1.5946 0.4823 0.0000 0.0404
Legend: Table 3.2 indicates the bias of the ATE in presence of interferences. Columns BIAS indicates the differences between the estimated ATE and the expected
value of β3 , columns RMSE represents the Root Mean Square Error, while the columns labeled as DID-Estimate shows the bias of the double differences
compared to the estimate of the regression model.
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Table 3.3. Results Novel DID with spatial heterogeneity
DID Spat-DID
n m Result S.Error Result S.Error True
Cons
225
100
1.1021 0.1154 1.0510 1.2894 1
D 1.0804 0.3896 1.0100 0.1258 1
t 0.9632 0.2267 1.0096 1.8279 1
Dt 1.0368 0.5734 0.9946 0.2050 1
Djt 0.2366 0.5910 0.0847 0.3286 0.1
DjD -0.1109 0.8428 0.0644 0.3505 0.1
DjDt -0.0366 1.3326 0.1043 0.5206 0.1
Cons
400
1.0672 0.0908 1.0909 1.1843 1
D 0.9845 0.3035 1.0035 0.0942 1
t 0.9881 0.1776 1.0042 1.6773 1
Dt 1.0119 0.4466 0.9972 0.1536 1
Djt 0.1507 0.4601 0.0895 0.2442 0.1
DjD 0.2028 0.6403 0.0941 0.2614 0.1
DjDt 0.0493 1.0165 0.1052 0.3887 0.1
Cons
625
0.9298 0.0749 0.9162 1.0860 1
D 0.9940 0.2485 0.9980 0.0753 1
t 0.9721 0.1477 1.0066 1.5376 1
Dt 1.0279 0.3663 0.9940 0.1226 1
Djt 0.2071 0.3852 0.0802 0.1977 0.1
DjD 0.1639 0.5242 0.1127 0.2101 0.1
DjDt -0.0071 0.8359 0.1094 0.3119 0.1
Cons
225
250
0.9798 0.1127 1.0010 1.1921 1
D 1.0318 0.3778 0.9985 0.1263 1
t 1.0068 0.2217 0.9926 1.6902 1
Dt 0.9932 0.5564 1.0060 0.2062 1
Djt 0.0699 0.5770 0.1200 0.3295 0.1
DjD -0.0235 0.8105 0.1213 0.3546 0.1
DjDt 0.1301 1.2855 0.0907 0.5279 0.1
Cons
400
0.9142 0.0944 0.9433 1.2383 1
D 1.0034 0.3148 0.9950 0.0938 1
t 0.9873 0.1853 0.9970 1.7536 1
Dt 1.0127 0.4636 1.0030 0.1526 1
Djt 0.1449 0.4800 0.1093 0.2444 0.1
DjD 0.0925 0.6644 0.1032 0.2603 0.1
DjDt 0.0551 1.0560 0.0946 0.3861 0.1
Cons
625
0.9262 0.0765 0.9199 1.0649 1
D 0.9885 0.2538 0.9996 0.0751 1
t 1.0301 0.1510 1.0010 1.5077 1
Dt 0.9699 0.3741 0.9994 0.1221 1
Djt -0.0097 0.3934 0.0978 0.1974 0.1
DjD 0.0906 0.5340 0.1035 0.2090 0.1
DjDt 0.2097 0.8520 0.1002 0.3102 0.1
Legend: Table 3.3 presents the results of the novel DID model in presence of spatial heterogeneity. n represents the number of units (225, 400 and 625), m the number
of replications (100 and 225), the columns DID (resp. Spat-DID) display the results of linear (resp. spatial) model, while the last column indicates the true
value of the parameter.
Table 3.4. Bias Novel DID with spatial heterogeneity
BIAS RMSE
n m OLS Spat-DID OLS Spat-DID
ATE
225
100
0.0368 -0.0054 1.4307 0.4846
AITET 0.0000 -0.0110 1.4307 0.4846
AITENT 0.1366 -0.0153 1.4307 0.4846
ATE
400
0.0119 -0.0028 1.5025 0.4820
AITET 0.0000 -0.0053 1.5025 0.4820
AITENT 0.0507 -0.0105 1.5025 0.4820
ATE
625
0.0279 -0.0060 1.5532 0.4828
AITET 0.0000 -0.0104 1.5532 0.4828
AITENT 0.1071 -0.0198 1.5532 0.4828
ATE
225
250
-0.0068 0.0060 1.3974 0.4865
AITET 0.0000 0.0107 1.3974 0.4865
AITENT -0.0301 0.0200 1.3974 0.4865
ATE
400
0.0127 0.0030 1.5632 0.4813
AITET 0.0000 0.0038 1.5632 0.4813
AITENT 0.0449 0.0093 1.5632 0.4813
ATE
625
-0.0301 -0.0006 1.5857 0.4813
AITET 0.0000 -0.0021 1.5857 0.4813
AITENT -0.1097 -0.0022 1.5857 0.4813
Legend: Table 3.4 indicates the bias of the ATE in presence of interferences. Columns BIAS indicates the differences between the estimated causal effects and their
expected value, columns RMSE represents the Root Mean Square Error.
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In Table 3.2 we demonstrate how the results of the double differences approach is coincident
with the linear regression model (Column DID-Estimate), nevertheless the RMSE demon-
strates that the spatial model suits better with the DGP. In Tables 3.3 and 3.4 we introduce
the formulation of our novel Diff-in-Diff with interferences. The results for the linear model
are biased, whereas spatial model reduces its bias when the sample size and the number
of replications increase. Furthermore, both models do not produce significant effect. To
conclude, the analysis of this case does not allow to identify a unique framework able to
provide unbiased and efficient causal effects in presence of interferences. Specifically, linear
model is able to estimate the true value of the ATE, while spatial model is preferable to
distinguish between direct and indirect effects. The ambiguous and not satisfactory con-
clusions obtained in the analysis of this case has required the introduction of an alternative
hierarchical method.
3.3.2 Spatial Heterogeneity with Neighbourhood Effects
The second case opens up to the possibility of spatial agglomeration between units. In this
framework, we consider 2 different level of hierarchy. The first corresponds to the unit level,
while the second indicates a macro-level in which the units are located (i.e. we can think
to the spatial distribution of the firms within some territorial areas, like provinces, regions,
etc.).
Figure 3.2. Difference in Spatial Distribution of units
Note: Figure 3.2 represents different spatial distribution of the units. Left panel shows the multilevel case: the different
colours of the units indicates the location in one macro-level. Right Panel indicates a uniform spatial distribution of the
units.
In Figure 3.2 we point out the differences between spatial agglomeration and uniform
distribution of the units. In detail, in the so-called spatial multilevel approach we identify 12
distinct macro-areas. The location in one area is random, while we open up to the possibility
of agglomeration inside the macro-areas. This hypothesis allows us to propose a two-level
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hierarchical model to estimate the DID with interferences.
Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt+ j + ui, where
I Level: Y = β0j + β1jD + β2jt+ β3jDt+ ui
II Level:

β0j = β0 + j
β1j = β1 + β5Dj
β2j = β2 + β4Dj
β3j = β3 + β6Dj
(3.13)
The estimation procedure in 3.13 is introduced in the columns indicated with SH-DID. The
consideration of a hierarchical model has a twofold relevance. On one hand, Corrado and
Fingleton (2012) observe how multilevel approach proposes alternative solutions to over-
come the identification problem in presence of interferences. On the other hand, hierarchical
model controls for the presence of heteroskedasticity both at unit and neighbourhood level
with a substantial improvement of the quality of the estimates. Furthermore, the ambiguous
results obtained in the previous case does not allows to identify a unique framework able to
provide correct total, direct and indirect effects. For these reasons, we modify the DGP in
3.3.1 introducing the presence of random effects at neighbourhood level.

yi = α+ βX + j + ui
ui = λWui + i
β = (β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6) = (1, 1, 1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
X = (D, t,Dt,Djt,DjD,DjDt)
λ = 0.5
Dj =WD with W considering the presence in neighborhood
Dj = d ∈ [0, 1]
i ∼ N(0, 0.1)
j ∼ N(0, σ2j )
The major differences in the DGP consists in the different determination of the spatial weight
matrix. While in 3.3.1 we use a row-standardized queen contiguity matrix at unit level, in
this circumstance we restrict the interactions to the belonging or not in a macro-area. Two
different units are considered neighbour only if they are located in the same macro-area. In
other words, considering the presence of nj units in a neighbourhood we attribute to each
units in the macro-area the same weight wij = 1nj−1 . Under this hypothesis, we are able to
estimate only intra-clusters indirect effects.
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Figure 3.3. Spatial Distribution with Neighbourhood Effects
Figure 3.3 shows the graphical representation of this DGP11. In this case, the units presents
an agglomerated distribution in the space. Consequently, the presence of areas in which
there are not units is represented with grey cells. Moreover, the colour of every cell indicates
the mean level of the units located in that precise point.
Table 3.5. Results of ”Traditional” DID with neighbourhood effects
DID Spat-DID SH-DID
n m Result S.Error Result S.Error Result S.Error True
Cons
225
100
0.9950 0.0136 0.9974 0.0556 1.0020 0.0525 1
D 1.0542 0.0209 1.0484 0.0081 1.0403 0.0079 1
t 1.0370 0.0192 1.0443 0.0787 1.0375 0.0071 1
ATE 1.0624 0.0296 1.0451 0.0115 1.0613 0.0107 1
Cons
400
1.0009 0.0073 0.9997 0.0286 1.0033 0.0272 1
D 1.0465 0.0111 1.0494 0.0063 1.0415 0.0061 1
t 1.0374 0.0103 1.0444 0.0404 1.0378 0.0055 1
ATE 1.0625 0.0157 1.0461 0.0089 1.0618 0.0083 1
Cons
625
1.0002 0.0046 1.0008 0.0139 1.0047 0.0134 1
D 1.0493 0.0069 1.0477 0.0053 1.0407 0.0052 1
t 1.0400 0.0065 1.0464 0.0197 1.0402 0.0048 1
ATE 1.0606 0.0097 1.0464 0.0076 1.0602 0.0071 1
Cons
225
250
0.9942 0.0132 0.9946 0.0531 0.9992 0.0500 1
D 1.0480 0.0203 1.0468 0.0084 1.0387 0.0081 1
t 1.0370 0.0187 1.0442 0.0751 1.0374 0.0072 1
ATE 1.0622 0.0287 1.0450 0.0118 1.0613 0.0110 1
Cons
400
1.0000 0.0074 0.9999 0.0289 1.0038 0.0275 1
D 1.0489 0.0114 1.0492 0.0066 1.0412 0.0064 1
t 1.0372 0.0105 1.0442 0.0409 1.0375 0.0057 1
ATE 1.0626 0.0161 1.0460 0.0093 1.0619 0.0087 1
Cons
625
0.9973 0.0045 0.9978 0.0133 1.0013 0.0129 1
D 1.0493 0.0067 1.0482 0.0053 1.0413 0.0052 1
t 1.0397 0.0063 1.0460 0.0188 1.0399 0.0048 1
ATE 1.0602 0.0095 1.0460 0.0076 1.0596 0.0071 1
Legend: Table 3.5 presents the results of Montecarlo Simulation in presence of neighbourhood effects. n represents the number of units (225, 400 and 625), m the
number of replications (100 and 225), the columns DID,Spat-DID and SH-DID display, respectively, the results of linear, spatial and hierarchical models, while
the last column indicates the true value of the parameter.
The presence of interferences produces biased estimates in the ”traditional” DID for the 3
different procedures. However, linear model fully capture the role of interactions between
units in estimating the ATE (see Appendix 3.B). On this basis, we assume linear ATE as
11An explanation of the meaning of every panel is in Figure 3.1
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Table 3.6. Bias/Efficiency DID with neighbourhood effects
BIAS RMSE DID-estimate
n m OLS Spat-DID SH-DID OLS Spat-DID SH-DID OLS Spat-DID SH-DID
ATE
225
100
0.0624 0.0451 0.0613 0.1539 0.0567 0.1193 0.0000 0.0173 0.0011
400 0.0625 0.0461 0.0618 0.1096 0.0590 0.0887 0.0000 0.0164 0.0007
625 0.0606 0.0464 0.0602 0.0852 0.0637 0.0748 0.0000 0.0142 0.0004
ATE
225
250
0.0622 0.0450 0.0613 0.1495 0.0585 0.1166 0.0000 0.0173 0.0009
400 0.0626 0.0460 0.0619 0.1119 0.0617 0.0911 0.0000 0.0166 0.0007
625 0.0602 0.0460 0.0596 0.0833 0.0636 0.0736 0.0000 0.0142 0.0005
Legend: Table 3.6 indicates the bias of the ATE in presence of interferences. Columns BIAS indicates the differences between the estimated ATE and the expected
value of β3 , columns RMSE represents the Root Mean Square Error, while the columns labeled as DID-Estimate shows the bias of the double differences
compared to the estimate of the regression model.
Table 3.7. Results Novel DID with neighbourhood effects
DID Spat-DID SH-DID
n m Result S.Error Result S.Error Result S.Error True
Cons
225
100
0.9950 0.0124 0.9967 0.0523 0.9975 0.0521 1
D 0.9985 0.1134 0.9961 0.0618 0.9970 0.0540 1
t 0.9883 0.0272 0.9913 0.1343 1.0000 0.0134 1
Dt 1.0117 0.1620 1.0015 0.0886 1.0000 0.0640 1
Djt 0.1320 0.0554 0.1208 0.2539 0.1001 0.0303 0.1
DjD 0.1235 0.2271 0.1083 0.1264 0.1064 0.1101 0.1
DjDt 0.0680 0.3268 0.0982 0.1797 0.0999 0.1296 0.1
Cons
400
1.0009 0.0069 0.9991 0.0271 0.9991 0.0270 1
D 0.9813 0.0552 1.0048 0.0425 1.0052 0.0372 1
t 1.0136 0.0150 1.0145 0.0718 1.0001 0.0104 1
Dt 0.9864 0.0789 0.9989 0.0605 0.9999 0.0440 1
Djt 0.0642 0.0302 0.0668 0.1374 0.0997 0.0235 0.1
DjD 0.1292 0.1085 0.0911 0.0862 0.0904 0.0751 0.1
DjDt 0.1358 0.1566 0.1006 0.1221 0.1003 0.0881 0.1
Cons
625
1.0002 0.0044 1.0002 0.0131 1.0006 0.0130 1
D 0.9891 0.0321 0.9959 0.0328 0.9960 0.0290 1
t 0.9998 0.0103 0.9994 0.0370 1.0001 0.0097 1
Dt 1.0002 0.0461 0.9999 0.0466 1.0000 0.0348 1
Djt 0.1005 0.0204 0.1017 0.0702 0.0999 0.0213 0.1
DjD 0.1210 0.0625 0.1064 0.0661 0.1062 0.0582 0.1
DjDt 0.0995 0.0908 0.1003 0.0937 0.1001 0.0691 0.1
Cons
225
250
0.9942 0.0122 0.9940 0.0501 0.9949 0.0497 1.0
D 0.9593 0.1008 0.9994 0.0549 0.9991 0.0482 1.0
t 0.9996 0.0270 0.9961 0.1295 1.0001 0.0137 1.0
Dt 1.0004 0.1441 0.9994 0.0789 0.9999 0.0577 1.0
Djt 0.1008 0.0547 0.1097 0.2452 0.0998 0.0312 0.1
DjD 0.1775 0.2007 0.0981 0.1127 0.0988 0.0986 0.1
DjDt 0.0992 0.2896 0.1015 0.1606 0.1003 0.1170 0.1
Cons
400
1.0000 0.0070 0.9993 0.0273 0.9994 0.0272 1.0
D 0.9720 0.0560 0.9994 0.0436 0.9999 0.0382 1.0
t 1.0063 0.0151 1.0043 0.0716 1.0000 0.0107 1.0
Dt 0.9937 0.0801 0.9998 0.0620 0.9999 0.0454 1.0
Djt 0.0826 0.0307 0.0894 0.1374 0.0999 0.0244 0.1
DjD 0.1550 0.1105 0.1025 0.0886 0.1014 0.0774 0.1
DjDt 0.1174 0.1594 0.0999 0.1255 0.1001 0.0913 0.1
Cons
625
0.9973 0.0043 0.9972 0.0125 0.9974 0.0125 1.0
D 1.0012 0.0301 0.9998 0.0311 0.9998 0.0276 1.0
t 1.0014 0.0100 1.0014 0.0352 1.0001 0.0097 1.0
Dt 0.9986 0.0433 0.9997 0.0443 0.9999 0.0334 1.0
Djt 0.0963 0.0200 0.0966 0.0673 0.0997 0.0214 0.1
DjD 0.0963 0.0588 0.1000 0.0632 0.0999 0.0558 0.1
DjDt 0.1037 0.0856 0.1005 0.0896 0.1003 0.0668 0.1
Legend: Table 3.7 presents the results of the novel DID model in presence of neighbourhood effects. n represents the number of units (225, 400 and 625), m the
number of replications (100 and 225), the columns DID, Spat-DID, SH-DID display, respectively, the results of linear, spatial and hierarchical models, while
the last column indicates the true value of the parameter.
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Table 3.8. Bias Novel DID with neighbourhood effects
BIAS RMSE
n m OLS Spat-DID SH-DID OLS Spat-DID SH-DID
ATE
225
100
0.0117 0.0015 0.0000 0.1395 0.0562 0.1179
AITET 0.0000 0.0190 0.0000 0.1395 0.0562 0.1179
AITENT 0.0320 0.0208 0.0001 0.1395 0.0562 0.1179
ATE
400
-0.0136 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.1032 0.0587 0.0876
AITET 0.0000 -0.0327 0.0000 0.1032 0.0587 0.0876
AITENT -0.0358 -0.0332 -0.0003 0.1032 0.0587 0.0876
ATE
625
0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0822 0.0633 0.0731
AITET 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0822 0.0633 0.0731
AITENT 0.0005 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0822 0.0633 0.0731
ATE
225
250
0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.1379 0.0580 0.1154
AITET 0.0000 0.0112 0.0001 0.1379 0.0580 0.1154
AITENT 0.0008 0.0097 -0.0002 0.1379 0.0580 0.1154
ATE
400
-0.0063 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.1053 0.0613 0.0896
AITET 0.0000 -0.0107 0.0000 0.1053 0.0613 0.0896
AITENT -0.0174 -0.0106 -0.0001 0.1053 0.0613 0.0896
ATE
625
-0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0805 0.0632 0.0721
AITET 0.0000 -0.0029 0.0000 0.0805 0.0632 0.0721
AITENT -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0003 0.0805 0.0632 0.0721
Legend: Table 3.8 indicates the bias of the ATE in presence of interferences. Columns BIAS indicates the differences between the estimated causal effects and their
expected value, columns RMSE represents the Root Mean Square Error.
benchmark value to analyse the results of the other estimation procedure. The estimates
of the spatial approach are biased and in line with the previous case; whereas the SH-DID
provides results similar to the linear model, demonstrating the unbiasedness of this approach
in estimating the total effect. Moreover, Table 3.6 shows how RMSE of both multilevel and
linear model converges to the one of the spatial approach when sample size and number of
replications increase, proving a substantial improvement of the quality of the estimates. The
estimates of the novel DID with interferences (Tables 3.7 and 3.8) show better performances
of the multilevel approach for all the different sample sizes and number of replications.
Moreover, hierarchical model provides unbiased estimates of both direct and indirect effects.
This model, controlling for the presence of spatial heteroskedasticity at neighbourhood level,
involves a substantial reduction of the standard errors and an improvement of the quality of
our estimates. Although multilevel model is an unbiased estimator of the Diff-in-Diffs in
presence of interferences, both spatial and linear models reduce their bias for high sample
size and number of replications. However, the results presented in Tables 3.5-3.8 indicates
the mean value of the parameters over the number of replications considered. Looking at the
distribution of the estimated parameters provides further evidences on the unbiasedness and
efficiency of the SH-DID.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the estimators of the parameters β3,β4 and β6. SH-DID
presents better performances compared to the other approaches. The superiority of the hier-
archical model can be observed both in terms of unbiasdeness and efficiency. Precisely, the
distribution of the SH-DID estimates presents a maximum on the true value of β3,β4 and β6.
Moreover, hierarchical approach reveals the less dispersed distribution. Figure 3.5 presents
a deeper investigation on the distribution of the parameter β6. This case is of particular
relevance for two distinct reasons. On one hand, β6 constitutes the parameter of the indirect
effects on the treated. On the other hand, it represents the case in which both linear and
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Figure 3.4. Density distribution of the parameter
Legend:Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the parameter β3,β4 and β6. Blue line represents SH-DID, green line the
Spat-DID, black line the linear model and the red line the ”true” value of the parameter.
Figure 3.5. In-Depth comparison density parameter β6
Legend:Figure 3.5 highlights the distribution of the parameter β6 over the Montecarlo simulation. Left panel shows the
results for the linear model and the central panel shows the distribution of the spatial model. The right panel compares
the distribution of β6 for the multilevel (blue line), spatial (green line) and linear (black line) approaches.
spatial model has better performances. Notwithstanding Spat-DID provides a satisfying
approximation of the real value of β6, it presents less efficient estimates in comparison
with SH-DID. To conclude, the SH-DID allows to recombine in a unique framework the
estimation of total, direct and indirect treatment effects when we introduce the presence of
spatial interferences.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper we present an alternative DID procedure that considers the presence of spatial
interferences. This paper aims to demonstrate the correctness of the ATE estimated by
”traditional” method even in presence of interferences. However, the development of an
alternative approach is required taking into account the inability of obtaining an unbiased
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decomposition of the ATE into direct and indirect effects. For this reason, we produce 2
different cases in order to find the optimal estimation procedure. The first case considers
the presence of spatial heterogeneity comparing the performances of a linear and a spatial
model. The results are ambiguous and do not permit to identify the optimal solution. Linear
model provides correct estimates of the ATE, while the spatial model produces unbiased
estimates of the direct and indirect effects. The introduction of neighbourhood effects and
an alternative hierarchical modelling allows to overcome the ambiguity in the choice of the
preferable methodology in presence of interferences between units. In fact, the multilevel
estimation procedure presents unbiased and more efficient estimates both for total, direct
and indirect effects. The results are in line with a part of the literature that suggests the
use of hierarchical model to deal with the identification problems in presence of spatial
heterogeneity (Corrado and Fingleton, 2011, 2012).
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APPENDIX
3.A Proofs of treatment effects
In this section we demonstrate the formulation of total, direct and indirect effects obtained
with the novel Diff-in-Diffs with interferences estimator. Recalling the equation (7), this
model is defined as:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt
The presence of interactions between units is considered by the inclusion of an additional
variable which, for each agents, represents the state of treatment of neighbours’ units. In
detail, Dj allows to control for the presence of heterogeneity on the interaction between
own and neighbours treatment (DjD) and estimate the temporal trends in response of
both neighbours state of treatment (Djt) and the interaction between own and neighbours
treatment (DjDt). In first instance, we demonstrate the formulation of the ”traditional”
ATE:
ATE =E[Y |D = 1, T = 1]− E[Y |D = 1, T = 0]− [E[Y |D = 0, T = 1]− E[Y |D = 0, T = 0]] =
(β0 + β1 + β2β3 + β4D1j + β5D1j + β6D1j − β0 − β1 − β5D1j )− (β0 + β2 + β4D0j − β0) =
β3 + β4(D1j −D0j ) + β6D1j
The ATE is a composite parameter of direct and indirect effects. The definition of these
effects recalls the one proposed by Hudgens and Halloran (2012). The direct effect is the
response of the individual to the treatment. We estimate the direct impact with a Diff-in-Diffs
estimator in the case in which the units do not have any neighbours treated. On the other
hand, the indirect effects are defined as the response of the individuals to the interferences.
Our approach starts from the idea that can exists differentiated impact of the interactions on
treated and controls. In this way, we isolate the indirect effect with a Diff-in-Diffs estimator
conditioning on time and on the level of interferences, maintaining constant the treatment
group.
ADTE =[E(Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj = 0)− E(Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj = 0)]− [E(Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj = 0)−
E(Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj = 0)] = (β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 − β0 + β1)− (β0 + β2 − β0) = β3
AITET = E[(Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj 6= 0)− E(Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj 6= 0)]− [E(Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj = 0)−
E(Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj = 0)] = [β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4D1j + β5D1j + β6D1j − (β0 + β1 + β5D1j )]−
[β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 − (β0 + β1)] = β4D1j + β6D1j
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AITENT = E[(Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj 6= 0)− E(Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj 6= 0)]− [E(Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj = 0)−
E(Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj = 0)] = (β0 + β2 + β4D0j − β0)− (β0 + β2 − β0) = β4D0j
Recombining direct and indirect effects we can recover the ATE.
3.B Proof of the Unbiasedness of the Decomposition Process of
the ATE
To demonstrate the unbiasedness decomposition of the ATE estimated by the linear model
we report the results of one simulation. In detail, the estimates are referred to the case of
100 simulation and 225 units with spatial heterogeneity12. From the simulation we obtain:
• ATE=1.0525
• D0j = 0.2657
• D1j = 0.3954
Taking into account the DGP, we expect direct and indirect effects equal to:
• E(ADTE) = β3 = 1
• E(AITET ) = (β4 + β6) ∗D1j = 0.2 ∗ 0.3954 = 0.0791
• E(AITENT ) = β4 ∗D0j = 0.1 ∗ 0.2657 = 0.0266
Recalling ATE definition, we recompose the overall effect as the sum of direct and indirect
effects in the following way:
ATE︸ ︷︷ ︸
β3+β4(D1j−D0j+β6)D1j
= ADTE︸ ︷︷ ︸
β3
+ AITET︸ ︷︷ ︸
(β4+β6)D1j
−AITENT︸ ︷︷ ︸
β4D0j
= 1+0.0791−0.0266 = 1.0525
Q.e.d., the decomposition process provides an unbiased estimator of the ATE and corre-
sponds to the results of the linear model.
12This case is reported as example. However, the demonstration of the correctness of linear estimator is
possible for all the other considered circumstances.
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Chapter 4
SH DID: An Empirical Application
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, R&D policies cover an increasingly relevant role in stimulating innovation.
Moreover, EU Commission aims to foster a ”smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” by
developing ”smart specialization” strategy (Foray et al., 2011). Smart specialization1 is a
”place-based” policy approach which requires that regions are able to identify, through an
entrepreneurial discovery process, the areas where they can better innovate and build up
international comparative advantages.
It follows an economic geography school of thought which recognises the presence of
heterogeneity between regions (von Tunzelmann, 2009), the influence of different types
of innovation on competitiveness (Jensen et al., 2007) and the manners in which different
institutional configurations can promote distinct economic activities.
Efficient Smart specialization policies rely on the concepts of embeddedness and connected-
ness. Camagni and Capello (2013) suggest the implementation of ad-hoc local policies to
adequately support regional innovation systems. This idea take into account that innovation
is rooted into localised and long-term processes2 and embedded in human capital, interper-
sonal network and skilled labour markets.
Innovation-related knowledge flows are embodied in both face-to-face interactions and the
mobility of human capital (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). From this perspective,
1McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2013) propose an interesting review of the rationale behind the reforms of
EU cohesion policies. The aforementioned authors distinguish between two different perspective to analyse the
novel policies approach: a rethinking of the role of industrial policy and the understanding of the relationship
between economic geography, institutions and technology. However, in this paper we will focus only on the
development of linkages between economical agents.
2In-depth analysis on the geographical dimension of innovation systems is in: Jaffe et al. (1993); Feldman
(1994); Audretsch and Feldman (1996, 2004); Anselin et al. (1997); Breschi and Lissoni (2001); Porter (1998);
Camagni (1991); Fritsch and Slavtchev (2011).
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the development of sectoral and spatial linkages becomes essential to foster knowledge
spillovers and, in wider term, innovation. The growing interest on spillover effects is not
limited to government viewpoint. In fact, the awareness and estimation of spillovers assumes
a primary role in causal analysis and policy evaluation.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of indirect effects in the traditional framework is not straight-
forward and can be considered as one of the main challenges for researchers, requiring a
substantial redefinition of the role covered by interactions between units. The identification
of the causal effects typically relies on the validity of the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption, or SUTVA3(Rubin, 1980). As previously discussed, this hypothesis imposes
the absence of interferences between units (Cox, 1959). For this reason, in the traditional
experimental approach, interferences are considered as nuisances, while major efforts are
devoted to design analysis able to isolate the presence of interferences from causal effects.
However, SUTVA does not allow a correct identification and estimation of the indirect
treatment effects.
Moreover, the development of place-based policies targeted to the formation of spatial and
social linkages between economic agents and the necessity to evaluate the effects of the
interferences makes the SUTVA a streamlined and unrealistic assumption. During the last
decade, this point assumes a primary role in causal analysis and the investigation of the
indirect effects by experimental methods becomes the centre of attention of part of the
literature.
In the remainder of this chapter we provide an in-depth analysis of the literature focuses
on the violation of the ”no-interferences” assumption. Moreover, we evaluate direct and
indirect treatment effects on Italian R&D expenditures. The estimates are implemented
by the modified Diff-in-Diff approach proposed in Di Gennaro and Pellegrini(2016). This
approach directly includes the presence of spatial interferences in the regression model. In
this way, it is possible to estimate direct and indirect effects by decomposing the ATE.
4.2 Review of the Literature
The identification and estimation of direct and indirect effects requires an exhaustive in-
vestigation of policy evaluation empirical studies and, in wider term, causal analysis in
presence of interferences4. First and foremost, it is fundamental to define the concepts of
direct or indirect effects. Hudgens and Halloran (2012), studying a setting with interactions
between units, define the ”direct effect” as the response of the agents to the treatment,
3The value of the outcome for unit i when exposed to treatment t will be the same regardless of the
treatments that other units receive (Rubin, 1974).
4See Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) and Becker (2015) for recent survey on policy evaluation studies. The
relevance of this theme for the Italian case is remarked by Caloffi et al. (2016).
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meanwhile they consider the ”indirect effect” as the response to the interferences. Under
this perspective, interactions between units have a twofold relevance. On the one hand, they
make possible the identification of correct total effects of the treatment. Conversely, the
presence of interferences in a causal framework is essential in the case in which treatment
induces interactions. However, a straightforward inclusion of interferences in causal analysis
is not possible.
Rosenbaum (2012) highlights the difficult specification and the potential boundless extent
of the interferences. Specification problem is addressed by modelling interferences with
appropriate proximity function. Literature proposes different proxy of the interferences,
including geographical distance, the nodal distance in a network or the state of treatment of
neighbours units.
Manski observes that the presence of interferences makes not possible to distinguish between
endogenous, exogenous and correlated effects, proposing the so-called ”Reflection Problem”
to resume the dilemma of the identification of causal effects in such framework (Manski,
1993, 2000, 2013). Notwithstanding, Corrado and Fingleton (2012) and Gibbons et al.
(2014) demonstrate that hierarchical and spatial econometrics approaches enable to deal
with the reflection problem. Theoretical and empirical analyses considering the potential
outcomes framework and its associated assumptions in a spatial context are still few and far
between (Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush, 2012; Feser, 2013; Gibbons et al., 2014).
Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush (2012) underline as the no-interference assumption is
likely to be violated in spatial settings because of various spillover, diffusion and displace-
ment effects. The authors develop a framework based on a generalized linear model with
spatially auto-correlated random effects. Their approach defines appropriate causal effects
by the inclusion of a function considering treatment assignments of all the units in the
potential outcome.
Sinclair et al. (2012) develop an alternative approach within a multilevel framework. This
method considers a hierarchical trial in which treatments are randomly assigned to individ-
uals and, varying proportions of their neighbours, provides evidence of within-household
spillovers in a large-scale voter-mobilization experiment conducted in Chicago. Notwith-
standing the relevance of the contents, literature considering spatial interferences in policy
evaluation studies is still uncommon.
De Castris and Pellegrini (2015) propose a methodology to estimate the ”net” effect of
Italian R&D subsidies based on a novel ”spatial propensity score matching” technique. The
authors observe a positive even if small crowding out effect across firms in the same area
and within neighbouring areas, mostly on the labour market. Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014)
analysing a capital subsidy policy estimate positive effects on subsidised firms in terms of
investment, turnover, and employment. However, employment growth is in part determined
by the detrimental effect on affected untreated firms located in the proximity of one or more
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treated firms belonging to the same sector.
Arpino and Mattei (2013) model interactions as a function of the characteristics of the
units. This function considers different factors, including geographical distance between
the firms and their sizes. In the case of small hand-craft firms in Italy, the aforementioned
authors demonstrate that additionality is reduced when treated firms are subject to high
levels of interference. Moreover, the average causal effect is slightly underestimated when
interferences are ignored.
Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016a) identify the presence of spillover effects by a comparison
between treated and controls on the basis of geographical localization and market concentra-
tion. However, this approach allows to estimate spillover effects only for the unsubsidised.
In this paper we identify and estimates the indirect effects following an alternative approach
developed by Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016b)5. This method, modelling the presence of
spatial interferences in a Difference in Difference framework, allows to decompose the aver-
age treatment effect and estimates separately direct and indirect causal impacts. Moreover,
the major innovation of this approach consists in the possibility to evaluate differentiated
indirect effects between treated and controls.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 Public Policies
In recent years, Eu Commission underlines the relevant role played by R&D and innovation
to foster growth. Notwithstanding, public and private R&D expenditures remain stable over
the last decade and distant from the 3% objective specified in the Horizon 2020 plan.
Figure 4.1 remarks the European lack of investments in innovation. In this context, Italy
exhibits R&D expenditures below European average, regardless of the source of funds.
More in detail, in 2007 Italy invests the 0.61 % of the GDP in private R&D, while the 0.52
% of the GDP is devoted to public expenditures. The inadequate effort on R&D appears
evidently comparing Italian and European averages. Indeed, EU private and public R&D is,
respectively, equal to 1.17 and 0.66 of the GDP.
The comparative analysis emphasises the shortage of private R&D expenditures. This
discrepancy is meaningful to determine the opportunity for Public intervention to obviate
private underinvestment. Furthermore, R&D expenditures are not uniformly distributed
across Italian Regions.
Figure 4.2 underlines a greater propensity to R&D processes in Northern Regions (with the
exception of Aosta Valley and Trentino South-Tirol), while Southern and Insular regions
5The approach presented in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.1. European R&D Expenditures by source of funds
Source: Eurostat
Note: Figure 3 shows the R&D expenditures in EU by source of funds in GDP percentage for the year
2007.
Figure 4.2. Italian R&D Expenditures in % of the GDP
Source: Eurostat
Note: This figure shows Italian Regional R&D expenditures for the year 2007. It demonstrates a greater
propensity to R&D process for the Central and Northern Regions.
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exhibit, on average, lower level of R&D expenditures. The development gap between North
and South does not affect only R&D expenses. Moreover, structural differences can also be
found in regional economic accounts and employment rate and are considered as one of the
major weakness of Italian economic system (MISE, 2015).
The lack of R&D investments and the territorial development gap makes necessary a strong
intervention both at European and National level. During the 2007-2013 programming
period, Italy is the third largest beneficiary of the European Union’s Cohesion Policy
after Poland and Spain, receiving a total of almost e29 billion in European aid (from the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF)) under
the Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment and European Territorial
Cooperation Objectives 6.
Table 4.1. Funds for Italy in Billion e2007-2013
Objective Fund EU National Public Total
Convergence ERDF 17.8 18 35.8ESF 3.7 3.9 7.6
Total Convergence 21.5 21.9 43.4
Regional Competitiveness and Employment ERDF 3.1 5 8.1ESF 3.2 4.4 7.6
Total Reg. Competitiveness and Employment 6.3 9.4 15.7
Total European Territorial Cooperation* ERDF 1 - 1
TOTAL 28.8 31.3 60.1
Source: EU Commission
Note:Figures have been rounded up.
*Each Territorial Cooperation programme includes a minimum of 15% co-financing from each par-
ticipating Member State.
Table 4.1 resumes the total amount of public funding in Italy between 2007-2013. The
country-wide financial commitment consists of e60 billion, fairly subdivided between
European and National funds. On the whole, Italy has defined 66 programmes:
• 19 programmes under the Convergence objective, with 10 programmes managed at
regional level, seven at national level and two interregional programmes;
• 33 programmes under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective (32
programmes managed at regional level and one managed at national level);
• 14 programmes under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective.
6The Convergence Objective concerns regions characterised by low levels of GDP and employment, where
GDP per head is less than 75% of the EU average. It applies to 99 regions representing 35% of the EU-27
population and aims to promote conditions conducive to growth and ones which lead to real-time convergence
in the least-developed Member States and regions. The Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective
is applicable to the rest of the EU, or to 172 regions, representing 65% of the EU-27 population. It aims to
enhance the competitiveness and attractiveness of regions, as well as boost their employment levels. The Italian
Convergence Regions are Campania, Apulia, Calabria, Sicily and Basilicata.
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The main objective in programming period 2007-13 is the reinforcement of Southern regions
to catch up with the European average in terms of GDP per capita. Investment in R&D and
innovation constitutes the greater part of overall investment. Italy allocate e9.6 billion to
this priority, in particular through the ”Research and Competitiveness” programme.
Figure 4.3. Objective of public policies
Note: Figure 4.3 shows the different objectives of the public policies distinguished by Region.
Figure 4.3, analysing the different objectives followed by the policies, remarks the structural
differences between Northern and Southern Regions. The firsts are subjects to policies
promoting internationalization and R&D, while the main objectives in Convergence Regions
are the growth of territorial competitiveness and the support to new businesses. The different
territorial objectives reflect the distinct state of advancement of technological processes
between North and South.
4.3.2 Data
In this work we provide evidence on direct and indirect additionality of public incentives
supplied to Italian firms. In detail, we evaluate policy effectiveness on R&D expenses using
two different waves of the Community Innovation Survey7 (CIS): 2008 and 2010. This data
are modelled on harmonized questionnaires at European level, therefore the results of the
Italian case can be easily extended and compared with studies based on different countries.
The definition of the dataset requires a preparatory identification of the firms participating to
7The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) are carried out with two years’ frequency by EU member states
and number of ESS member countries. The CIS is a survey of innovation activity in enterprises. The harmonised
survey is designed to provide information on the innovativeness of sectors by type of enterprises, on the different
types of innovation and on various aspects of the development of an innovation, such as the objectives, the
sources of information, the public funding, the innovation expenditures, etc. CIS provides statistics broken
down by type of innovators, economic activities and size classes (Eurostat).
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both CIS waves.
This process allows to individuate more than 7000 firms. The introduction of indirect effects
requires to geolocate companies along Italian territory. Considering the large sample size,
we determine the geographical coordinates at municipal level (i.e. every firms located in
the same city have same coordinates), while the outcome variables and the treatment are
still at unit level. The definition of treatment group does not distinguish between European,
national and regional incentives.
In this way, we are able to include all the incentives provided to firms avoiding the presence
of treated units in control group8. Conversely, the correct identification of a pre and post
treatment period required the exclusion from the sample of all the firms subsidized on 2008
or on both periods, reducing the sample size to 2389 SMEs of which only 145 treated.
Figure 4.4. Spatial Distribution of the firms
Note: This figure represents the spatial distribution of the firms, distinguishing between treated and control.
Figure 4.4 shows the geographical localization of the firms. The majority of the units are
located in the north of the Italy, even if the presence of isolated treated, especially in Southern
and Insular Italy, has interesting implication on the results. In further detail, the foregoing
insight enables to check the case in which there are a limited number of interferences as a
consequence of the exposition to neighbours state of treatment.
The summary statistics at baseline period shows some structural differences between treated
and control groups, both in terms of size and propensity to innovation. This outline can
8For example, limiting the analysis on regional subsidies we are able to define an appropriate control group.
Notwithstanding, the firms not subsidized can obtain incentives administered at national or European Level
invalidating the correctness of our results. Otherwise, considering all the different level of incentives we are
able to define correct treated and control group and obtain unbiased estimates.
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics
Variables Control Treated
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Turnovers 2006 2244 6095743.00 6471570.00 145 8022972.0 7113732.0
Employees 2006 2244 32.21 28.00 145 47.2 34.1
Presence in Local Market 2244 0.94 0.23 145 0.9 0.3
Presence in National Market 2244 0.53 0.50 145 0.8 0.4
Turnover share from innovation for the market 2244 0.02 0.09 145 0.2 0.2
Turnover share from innovation for the firms 2244 0.03 0.13 145 0.1 0.2
Turnover share from marginal innovation 2244 0.96 0.29 145 0.7 0.3
Source: Control Covariates for baseline period (2008)
be, at least, partially influenced by the limited sample size of the treated group. However,
the implementation of a Difference in Difference approach allows to check and remove
systematic differences between the groups.
Moreover, considering the objective of testing a novel framework able to include spatial
interferences in causal analysis, an additional control is required. In detail, we need to
analyse if the spatial distribution of the treatment variable is random or clustered. The
presence of spatial autocorrelation is tested by the Moran’s I Index evaluated on 4 different
cut-off distances ( 40 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km). The 4 distinct cut-off allow to understand
the spatial extension of the interferences and, in consequence, of the indirect effects.
Table 4.3. Moran I Index
Distance Moran I Index Expected Value P-value
40 Km 0.0037 -0.0004 0.1840
50 Km 0.0076 -0.0004 0.0400
75 Km 0.0076 -0.0004 0.0080
100 Km 0.0089 -0.0004 0.0010
Source: Estimates of the Moran I index based on 1000 simulation
The results show a random spatial pattern of treatment variable at a cut-off distance equal to
40 km, whereas we find evidence of spatial clustering in all the other cases. This results allow
to analyse how the presence of spatial autocorrelation in treatment variable influences the
correctness of the estimates. In the next section we introduce the methodological approach
proposed by Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016b).
4.3.3 Econometric Model
The definition of a novel framework in which the interferences assume a fundamental role
in the identification of the causal effects take inspiration from the ”traditional” Potential
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Outcome Model.
yi = Diy1 + (1−Di)y0 =
y
1 if D = 1
y0 if D = 0
(4.1)
where D indicates the state of treatment. Rosenbaum (2012) argues that in presence of
interferences the number of potential outcome depends on the sample size and the number
of treated units. This consideration makes intractable the identification of the potential
outcomes.
However, restricting the extension of the interferences allows to overcome the identification
problems. The approach followed in this paper, taking into account only the spatial dimen-
sion of the interactions between units, is based on a proximity function modelled on the
state of treatment of the neighbours. Our method preserves the validity of the ”traditional”
potential outcome model (POM), even if the inclusion of the spatial interferences enables
the decomposition of the overall causal impact in direct and indirect effects.
y = Dy1 + (1−D)y0 +Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)−Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0) (4.2)
The POM in 4.1 corresponds to the equation in 4.1 plus/minus 4.2 itself pre-multiplied by
Dj . The latter term represents neighbours’ state of treatment and is obtained applying a
spatial lag of the treatment variable. Moreover, 4.2 can be rearranged as:
y = (1−Dj)(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect without interactions
+Dj(Dy1 + (1−D)y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect interactions
(4.3)
Under the formulation in 4.3 we are able to identify both direct and indirect effects. More
specifically, the first term in 4.3 represents the direct effect (i.e. the total effect purified by
the impact of the interferences), while the latter individuates the indirect effect. This insight
allows to decompose the ATE as the sum of direct and indirect effects, as briefly reported in
4.4.
ATE = ADTE +AITE = (1−Dj)ATE +DjATE (4.4)
This intuition constitutes the cornerstone of the Difference-in-Difference approach elaborated
on the remainder of the paper. Therefore, the ongoing consideration leads us to a substantial
review of the ”traditional” Diff-in-Diff estimator. Recalling that β3 represents the ATE
estimated by the following equation:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2T + β3DT (4.5)
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which can be expressed in analogous way in term of expectations:
aS = E[Y |D = 1, T = 1] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3
bS = E[Y |D = 1, T = 0] = β0 + β1
cS = E[Y |D = 0, T = 1] = β0 + β2
dS = E[Y |D = 0, T = 0] = β0
ATE = (aS − bS)− (cS−dS) = β3
(4.6)
4.5 and 4.6 provides correct estimates of the ATE, although they omits the presence of
interferences between units. In this paper, we introduce the interactions into the regression
model in 4.5 adapting the line of reasoning in 4.2. In other words, we include an additional
part in the ”standard” DID multiplied by Dj to model the presence of spatial interactions.
Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt (4.7)
The specification in 4.7 allows to estimate simultaneously total, direct and indirect causal ef-
fects. Implementing the ”standard” Diff-in-Diff approach to 4.7 provides unbiased estimates
of the ATE. Notwithstanding, in this case we are able to decompose the ATE, identifying
the effects attributable to the interferences. Thus, the formulation of the ATE becomes:
ATE = β3 + β4(D1j −D0j ) + β6D1j (4.8)
The terms D1j and D
0
j indicate, respectively, the average share of neighbours treated for
subsidized and controls. As previously said, the ATE in 4.8 is obtained applying a double dif-
ference with respect to own state of treatment and time. The estimation of direct and indirect
effects requires an introductory presentation of all the possible combinations by conditioning
on time, own and neighbours’ state of treatment (i.e. E[Y |D, t,Dj ] ). Considering Dj 6= 0
allows to include the cases in which the treatment induces spatial interactions between units,
i.e. in the neighbourhood of the considered unit is located at least one subsidised.
a = E[Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4D1j + β5D1j + β6D1j
b = E[Y |D = 1, t = 1, Dj = 0] = β0 + β1 + β2 + β3
c = E[Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β1 + β5D1j
d = E[Y |D = 1, t = 0, Dj = 0] = β0 + β1
e = E[Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj 6= 0] = β0 + β2 + β4D0j
f = E[Y |D = 0, t = 1, Dj = 0] = β0 + β2
g = E[Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj 6= 0] = β0
h = E[Y |D = 0, t = 0, Dj = 0] = β0
(4.9)
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The direct effect (ADTE) is evaluated by a Diff-in-Diff on the units without neighbours’
treated, i.e. ADTE comprehends the situation in which interactions as response to the
treatment are absent. Along these lines, we obtain the ADTE as in 4.10:
ADTE = b− d− f + h = β3 (4.10)
Another feature of our model specification is the ability to provide differentiated indirect
effect both on treated and controls. These effects are obtained through a double difference
estimator on time and neighbours’ treatment, keeping constant own state of treatment.
AITET = a− c− b+ d = β4D1j + β6D1j (4.11)
AITENT = e− g − f + h = β4D0j (4.12)
4.11 and 4.12 constitute respectively the AITET (Average Indirect Treatment Effects on
the Treated) and the AITENT (Average Indirect Treatment Effects on the Controls). The
AITET (resp. AITENT) underlines the additional effect on the treated (resp. control) of
being located in the neighbourhood of subsidized units. Next section is devoted to the
implementation and the discussion of the results of the proposed methodology on Italian
R&D policies.
4.4 Results
The objective of this paper is the evaluation of both direct and indirect additionality of Italian
innovation policies. As mentioned above, the effectiveness of the treatment is computed
using the informations from Community Innovation Surveys. CIS data provide detailed
informations on R&D processes, including the benefits from public incentives, R&D expen-
ditures, R&D outputs, data referred to formation and marketing, etc.
Taking into account the short time frame between pre and post treatment period, we investi-
gate only the results on R&D expenditures. In fact, it is reasonable to expect in first instance
an additional impact on innovation expenses, while the evaluation on R&D outputs and
economic performance can require a longer time period. In other words, we are not able to
properly analyse economic performances in our short term analysis.
Thus, our study is restricted on the evaluation of the effects on total R&D, internal R&D,
external R&D and a residual component (Other R&D)9. The choice of these variables is
adherent for obtaining detailed information on the process of production of innovation and
9The Internal R&D includes systematic or occasional activities developed by the firms with own personnel
and equipment. The term external R&D is referred to innovation activities implemented by other firms or
institution, whereas other R&D is a comprehensive indicator which includes acquisition of equipment, design,
formation and training, marketing, etc.
4.4 Results 71
R&D.
To ensure robust and unbiased estimates of both direct and indirect effects we follow the
approach in Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016b). The aforementioned authors demonstrate
how the linear model is an unbiased estimator only of the ATE. Indeed, the linear approach is
not able to adequately distinguish between direct and indirect effects, i.e. linear model does
not allow to estimate separately the parameters of the interferences (Djt) and the interaction
between own treatment and the share of treated units in the neighbourhood (DjDt).
The introduction of an alternative hierarchical specification, with heterogeneity at municipal
level considered in the random effects, is therefore required to provide unbiased estimates of
both indirect effects on treated and controls. Resuming, in this paper we apply 5 different
estimation procedures (reported in the results with the numbers between 1 to 5):
1. Y = β0 + β1D + β2T + β3DT
2. Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt
3. Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjDt
4. Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β5DjD + β6DjDt+ j
5. Y = β0 + β1D + β2t+ β3Dt+ β4Djt+ β6DjDt+ j
The firsts 3 models are estimated by a linear procedures, while the latter 2 are evaluated by a
hierarchical approach. More specifically, model 1 represents the traditional ”Diff-in-Diff”
approach and it constitutes the benchmark for ATE estimates. The presence of interferences
are considered in all the remaining cases.
Furthermore, the difference between linear (resp. hierarchical) models 2 and 3 (resp. 4 and
5) consists of the removal of systematic control for the presence of heterogeneity due to the
interactions between own and neighbours state of treatment. This approach allows us to draw
attention on the role played by heterogeneity at neighbourhood level on the unbiasedness of
indirect effects estimates.
The behaviour of treatment effects over space is investigated by 4 different spatial weight
matrix based on the following cut-off distances: 40 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km. Taking into
account different cut-off distances, the geographical extension of both direct and indirect
effects is properly evaluated. Moreover, we are able to identify the spatial trend followed by
direct and indirect causal impacts. This procedure permits to obtain information on their
optimal dimension over the space.
Figure 4.5 analyse the share of neighbours treated for all the firms included in our analysis
along Italian territory. Every panel represent a different cut-off distances. This procedure
makes possible an in-depth analysis on the impact of the distance on the quota of neighbours
treated. For small distances, it appears a limited number of firms characterised by high level
of spatial interferences (i.e. yellow and purple units), while the majority of them present a
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Figure 4.5. Spatial distribution of the proportion of treated neighbours
Note: Figure 5 shows the different quotas of treated neighbours for each firms when we consider different
cut-off distances. The considered cut-off are: 40 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km.
low share of treated neighbours (dark blue). Conversely, increasing cut-off distances implies
a reduction, on average, of spatial interferences. In detail, for a cut-off of 100 km the spatial
distribution exhibits low levels of interferences (more or less between 0.0 and 0.15). The
shortcoming of long-distance interactions highlights possible linkages between physical
distance and diffusion of the indirect effects10. This relation is deepened in the discussion of
the results.
10To give an example: we can imagine three different firms (A,B and C) located along a straight line and only
one of them (A) is treated. The distance between A-B is 20 km, while A-C is 50 km far. It seems reasonable to
assume that indirect effect of being subject to the treatment of A decreases with the distances. Thus, we expect a
greater impact on B in comparison with the effect on C.
Table 4.4. Results
OUTCOME
Total R&D Internal R&D External R&D Other R&D Total R&D per Employee
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Dt 210227.4*** 321544.8** 579792.4*** 322829.3** 560744*** 85254.9** -21882.5 215938.1*** -18851.7 202543.5*** 43571.4** 214291*** 233369.0*** 214361.9*** 231258.3*** 81401.1** 129136.3* 130485.3** 129689* 125453.1** 534.10 3776.5 5446.4** 3829.1 5240.2**
[69328.8] [131220.4] [105588.4] [128998.1] [104315.1] [38792.1] [73382.2] [59163.6] [71665.9] [58101.0] [18674.5] [35163.8] [28265.1] [34677.0] [28017] [36528.7] [69370.1] [55755.7] [69024.5] [55612.7] [1698.1] [3222.7] [2590.5] [3211.6] [2586.5]
Djt -2453.3 -2453.3 19440.3 64078.3 -7456.9 -7456.9 42937.0 86124.6 -808.9 -808.9 417.5 3625.6 5812.5 5812.5 15205.3 14646.2 21.0 21.0 911.1 1071.0
40 [265623.6] [265900.2] [295391.25] [295376.5] [148544.2] [148990.0] [165973] [166258.9] [71180.5] [71179.3] [79494.9] [79413.7] [140422.7] [140408.0] [150123.7] [150030.6] [6523.6] [6523.5] [6905.1] [6901.8]
DjDt -1740489.6 -5778613*** -1762383.3 -5485135.5*** 1675694.8* -2043020.6*** 1625300.9Ârˇ -1839076.5*** -2669435.3*** -2967750*** -2670661.8*** -2935048.8*** -746749.1 -767842.7 -756141.9 -689876.3 -50701.7 -76814** -51591.8 -73665.8**
[1746459.7] [1250436.3] [1718881.4] [1241905.4] [976669.9] [700648] [955053.7] [692208.7] [468008] [334731.4] [462070.9] [333574.3] [923271.4] [660290.1] [919263.6] [660257.1] [42892.5] 30677.6 [42767.0] [30692.2]
Dt 210227.4*** 317075.4** 836312.8*** 319166.1** 806701.9*** 85254.9** 76498.2 476822.0*** 80033.6 454193.5*** 43571.4** 266426.9*** 312577.3*** 266711.8*** 309128.9*** 81401.1** -25849.7 46913.6 -24773.2 39209.0 534.10 667.9 6269.7** 758.9 5887.6**
[69328.8] [151726.5] [118948.6] [149330.7] [117735.6] [38792.1] [84566.9] [66487.2] [82731.1] [65458.1] [18674.5] [40698] [31816.7] [40177.8] [31595.9] [36528.7] [80545.0] [62960.2] [80171.6] [62825.1] [1698.1] [3740.6] [2925.1] [3729.5] [2921.7]
Djt -109582.7 -109582.7 -74142.0 16734.4 -5646.5 -5646.5 53368.6 126729.8 -3767.2 -3767.2 1044.6 9098.7 -100169.0 -100169.0 -82020.1 -73729.2 -707.1 -707.1 824.5 1381.1
50 [320069.4] [321043.7] [364895.0] [365632.1] [178395.1] [179449.8] [204916.9] [205892.3] [85852.9] [85873.7] [98263.6] [98213.7] [169910.9] 169930.4 [184312.9] [184210.8] [7890.9] [7894.8] [8440.9] [8447.4]
DjDt -1565786.5 -9234751*** -1601227.3 -8812187*** 129968.4 -5782680.5*** 70953.3 -5463511*** -3291078.3*** -3972703.5*** -3295890*** -3923281.3*** 1595323.4 520633.6 1577174.5 631246.6 -1896.8 -84634.2** -3428.5 -79240**
[2002662.7] [1438433.5] [1974272.8] [1430472.5] [1116212.3] [804023.3] [1093964.5] [795889.9] [537178.9] [384756.3] [531189.8] [383906.6] [1063126.3] [761371.8] [1059152.4] [761272.6] [49373.2] [35372.8] [49262.2] [35385.9]
Dt 210227.4*** 257363.5 907051*** 262226.4 869538.1*** 85254.9** 76745.7 526025.6*** 81925.8 500731.8*** 43571.4** 234632.4*** 304077.7*** 235739.4*** 299538*** 81401.1** -54014.7 76947.6 -52150.4 66348.2 534.10 383.8 9099.8*** 443.6 8575.9**
[69328.8] [183465.1] [139944.8] [180659.0] [138477.5] [38792.1] [102389.3] [78230.6] [100198.5] [76977.5] [18674.5] [49384.6] [37571.5] [48774.3] [37297.5] [36528.7] [97270.3] [73999.6] [96853.3] [73856.5] [1698.1] [4515.7] [3437] [4503.4] [3433.8]
Djt -50221.2 -50221.2 31781.5 172869.0 12864.5 12864.5 99699.4 204356.4 -6423.9 -6423.9 12166.8 27227.5 -56661.8 -56661.8 -25241.0 -8481.8 1865.1 1865.1 2882.8 3810.5
75 [384978.9] [386136.5] [453418.7] [453941.7] [214851.4] [215854.5] [255562.3] [256220.7] [103627.5] [103667.6] [122594.3] [122463] [204109.8] [204180.3] [225247.2] [225127.8] [9475.5] [9483.3] [10270.5] [10280.9]
DjDt -694491.4 -10344477*** -776494.1 -9812878*** 124945.8 -6548331*** 38110.9 -6194267*** -2837161.3*** -3868651.3*** -2855752*** -3805058.3*** 2017724.0 72505.6 1986303.3 224331.6 2023.2 -127438.2*** 1005.5 -119890.5***
[2531868] [1816324.1] [2497161.5] [1802749.3] [1413000.4] [1015344.9] [1385237] [1002568.2] [681521] [487635.6] [674194] [485573.7] [1342356.8] [960431.4] [1337744.4] [959891.9] [62317.2] [44608.0] [62189.9] [44613.6]
Dt 210227.4*** 699105.9*** 1622686.5*** 699838.1*** 1556882*** 85254.9** 83825.8 808295.9*** 86363.9 768595.6*** 43571.4** 398763.8*** 487814.4*** 397758.0*** 481707.7*** 81401.1** 216516.3* 326576.2*** 219294.1* 307179.6** 534.10 4888.7 16749.7*** 4980.6 15946.1**
[69328.8] [229717.5] [171128.2] [226349.4] [169816.5] [38792.1] [128248.3] [95886.5] [125537.1] [94613.3] [18674.5] [61876.7] [45944.3] [61120.9] [45726.0] [36528.7] [122405.4] [90861.1] [121901.9] [90837.4] [1698.1] [5680.1] [4219.8] [5665.5] [4221.6]
Djt 136358.7 136358.7 149253.5 360663.2 53489.2 53489.2 96230.6 279364.9 814.3 814.3 -16002.9 5095.8 82055.2 82055.2 128905.6 141575.6 4159.4 4159.4 5718.6 6992.3
100 [438059.3] [439662.5] [529803.9] [530607.7] [244562.8] [246351.5] [299238.6] [300592.4] [117995.5] [118040.2] [143367.4] [143141.3] [233420.6] [233440] [261834.4] [261697.2] [10831.6] [10841.5] [11880.0] [11906.3]
DjDt -7258381.5** -20940528*** -7271276** -19992560*** 14887.8 -10717588*** -27853.6 -10156122*** -5262002.5*** -6581219.5*** -5245185.5*** -6491314.5*** -2011266.8 -3641720.8*** -2058117.0 -3361561.8*** -64998.7 -240710.4*** -66557.8 -229153.4***
[3254798] [2330740.3] [3211352] [2317760.5] [1817111.5] 1305959.0 [1781330.9] [1291727.1] [876711.5] [625754.9] [867173.3] [624117.1] 1734324.8 [1237513.9] [1728412] [1238417.5] [80479.2] [57472.9] [80317.3] [57541.9]
Significance Level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
Standard Errors in Square Bracket
List of approach
[1] Traditional DID
[2] Linear DID with Interferences, complete model
[3] Linear DID with Interferences, alternative specification without control for DjD
[4] Multilevel DID with interferences, complete model with inclusion of random effects at provincial and regional level
[5] Multilevel DID with interferences, alternative specification (No DjD) with inclusion of random effects at provincial and regional level
The inclusion or not of a treated unit in the neighbourhood of the others are calculated by different cut-off distances: 40 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km
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Firstly, we analyse the total impact of the treatment (model 1). The estimates demonstrate
positive and significant ATE for almost all the outcome variables, with the exception of Total
R&D per employee. This results provides evidence on the additionality on R&D expenses.
Moreover, the ATE estimated in model 1 constitutes the benchmark for the decomposition
process proposed with the alternative Difference in Difference models11.
Considering spatial interactions between units, we observe significant and positive direct
effects, particularly in relation to total and external R&D expenses (models 2 and 4). Direct
effect is bigger than the total impact, suggesting the presence of negative externalities.
This is confirmed by negative and meaningful AITET on both above-mentioned variables.
Moreover, we demonstrate the spatial limited extent of the spillover effects and the downfall
of spatial interferences for high distances.
For instance, external R&D exhibits a wider direct effect for bigger distances. Conversely,
indirect effects are characterised by an inverse relation with distance. This intuition is
confirmed by the results on total R&D expenses. However, our analysis does not produce
evidence of spillover effects on control units (i.e. the impact of having neighbours treated),
even if, on the whole, we can observe positive and not significant effects.
In summary, having neighbours treated provides a small improvement on R&D expenses of
the control units. However, treated units do not have benefits from having treated neighbours.
Moreover, increasing the level of spatial interferences increase the detrimental effects of
having neighbours treated.
Models 3 and 5 underline the estimation bias if we erroneously omit the check for hetero-
geneity due to the interaction between own and neighbours state of treatment. The bias of
the estimates appear clear in particular with reference to direct and indirect effects on the
treated. Nevertheless, the results of the ”restricted” model are in line with the ones of the
complete model for both direct and indirect effects.
As indicated in the preceding section, the results of the novel SH-DID model can be
easily recombined in the ATE. Table 4.5 resumes the decomposition process of the ATE,
highlighting the average intensity of both direct and indirect effects. This table gives a clear
overview on the extension of treatment effects. The analysis of the paths followed by the
decomposition process open up two distinct considerations.
On the one hand, the complete models (i.e. 2 and 4) shows equal estimates of the AITET,
but differentiated results for ADTE and AITENT. As explained above, this is mainly due
to the different estimation procedures. Indeed, linear model does not correctly distinguish
between different indirect effects, even if it is able to catch unbiased ATE estimates. Instead,
hierarchical model is a good approximation of both total, direct and indirect effects and,
on the whole, the SH-DID model produces unbiased and more efficient estimates. This
11As mentioned above, our approach allows to decompose the ATE in direct and indirect effects. The
robustness and correctness of this methodology requires to take into account the unbiased ATE obtained by the
”traditional” Diff-in-Diff.
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Table 4.5. Decomposition of the ATE
40 50 75 100
ADTE AITET AITENT ATE ADTE AITET AITENT ATE ADTE AITET AITENT ATE ADTE AITET AITENT ATE
[1] 210227.4 210227.4 210227.4 210227.4
[2] 321544.8 -111465.3 -147.9 210227.4 317075.4 -113433.1 -6585.2 210227.4 257363.5 -50137.9 -3001.9 210227.4 699105.9 -480755.1 8123.4 210227.4
Total R&D [3] 579792.4 -369712.9 -147.9 210227.4 836312.8 -632670.6 -6585.2 210227.4 907051.0 -699825.4 -3001.9 210227.4 1622686.5 -1404335.8 8123.4 210227.4
[4] 322829.3 -111465.3 1172.3 210191.7 319166.1 -113433.1 -4455.4 210188.4 262226.4 -50137.9 1899.7 210188.8 699838.1 -480755.1 8891.6 210191.5
[5] 560744.0 -346689.5 3864.0 210190.6 806701.9 -595507.8 1005.6 210188.5 869538.1 -649015.8 10332.9 210189.3 1556882.0 -1325204.4 21486.0 210191.7
[1] 85254.9 85254.9 85254.9 85254.9
[2] -21882.5 106687.8 -449.7 85254.9 76498.2 8417.4 -339.3 85254.9 76745.7 9278.1 768.9 85254.9 83825.8 4615.6 3186.5 85254.9
Internal R&D [3] 215938.1 -131132.9 -449.7 85254.9 476822.0 -391906.4 -339.3 85254.9 526025.6 -440001.8 768.9 85254.9 808295.9 -719854.5 3186.5 85254.9
[4] -18851.7 106687.8 2589.1 85247.0 80033.6 8417.4 3207.1 85243.9 81925.8 9278.1 5959.3 85244.6 86363.9 4615.6 5732.8 85246.7
[5] 202543.5 -112105.4 5193.4 85244.7 454193.5 -361333.9 7615.6 85244.0 500731.8 -403272.1 12215.0 85244.7 768595.6 -666706.9 16642.8 85246.0
[1] 43571.4 43571.4 43571.4 43571.4
[2] 214291.0 -170768.5 -48.8 43571.4 266426.9 -223081.9 -226.4 43571.4 234632.4 -191445.0 -384.0 43571.4 398763.8 -355143.9 48.5 43571.4
OUTCOME External R&D [3] 233369.0 -189846.4 -48.8 43571.4 312577.3 -269232.3 -226.4 43571.4 304077.7 -260890.3 -384.0 43571.4 487814.4 -444194.5 48.5 43571.4
[4] 214361.9 -170768.5 25.2 43568.3 266711.8 -223081.9 62.8 43567.1 235739.4 -191445.0 727.2 43567.1 397758.0 -355143.9 -953.4 43567.4
[5] 231258.3 -187471.5 218.6 43568.2 309128.9 -265014.9 546.8 43567.2 299538.0 -254343.3 1627.5 43567.2 481707.7 -437836.7 303.6 43567.4
[1] 81401.2 81401.2 81401.2 81401.2
[2] 129136.3 -47384.6 350.5 81401.2 -25849.7 101231.4 -6019.5 81401.2 -54014.7 132029.0 -3386.8 81401.2 216516.3 -130226.8 4888.3 81401.2
Other R&D [3] 130485.3 -48733.6 350.5 81401.2 46913.6 28468.1 -6019.5 81401.2 76947.6 1066.7 -3386.8 81401.2 326576.2 -240286.7 4888.3 81401.2
[4] 129689.0 -47384.6 916.9 81387.4 -24773.2 101231.4 -4928.8 81387.1 -52150.4 132029.0 -1508.7 81387.3 219294.1 -130226.8 7679.4 81387.9
[5] 125453.1 -43182.6 883.2 81387.4 39209.0 37747.5 -4430.6 81387.1 66348.2 14532.1 -507.0 81387.4 307179.6 -217357.5 8434.2 81387.9
[1] 534.1 534.1 534.1 534.1
Total R&D [2] 3776.5 -3241.2 1.3 534.1 667.9 -176.3 -42.5 534.1 383.8 261.8 111.5 534.1 4888.7 -4106.8 247.8 534.1
per Employee [3] 5446.4 -4911.1 1.3 534.1 6269.7 -5778.1 -42.5 534.1 9099.8 -8454.2 111.5 534.1 16749.7 -15967.8 247.8 534.1
[4] 3829.1 -3241.2 54.9 533.0 758.9 -176.3 49.5 533.0 443.6 261.8 172.3 533.0 4980.6 -4106.8 340.7 533.1
[5] 5240.2 -4642.6 64.6 533.0 5887.6 -5271.5 83.0 533.0 8575.9 -7815.1 227.8 533.0 15946.1 -14996.5 416.6 533.1
List of approach
[1] Traditional DID
[2] Linear DID with Interferences, complete model
[3] Linear DID with Interferences, alternative specification without control for DjD
[4] Multilevel DID with interferences, complete model with inclusion of random effects at provincial and regional level
[5] Multilevel DID with interferences, alternative specification (No DjD) with inclusion of random effects at provincial and regional level
The inclusion or not of a treated unit in the neighbourhood of the others is calculated by different cut-off distances: 40 km, 50 km, 75 km, 100 km
conclusion is in line with Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016).
On the other hand, the decomposition of the ATE shows a strong and positive direct addi-
tionality of the policies, while the results on the indirect effects are ambiguous. Indeed, the
estimates shows negative and significant spillovers on the treated, while positive a negligible
effects on the controls. Furthermore, both direct and indirect effects are influenced by the
distance. The paths followed by treatment effects for different cut-off distances have a dual
implication on the results. While ADTE increases with distance, we observe a decline of the
AITET on treated and a substantial improvement of the AITENT.
To summarize, the different impact of geographical distance sustains the hypothesis at the
basis of this thesis. Omitting the role of interferences in causal analysis do not allows to
fully understand the effectiveness of the policies. In other terms, only the inclusion of
interferences makes possible to fully analyse and understand the spatial dimension of both
direct and indirect effects.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of public policies in Italy to foster innovation and
R&D processes. The results show significant and positive ATE on total, internal and external
R&D expenses. Considering that this paper focuses only on short-term effects, the choice of
R&D expenditures to evaluate public policies effectiveness is preferable. In fact, it seems
reasonable to expect a longer temporal lag between innovation production and economic
and financial benefits on the activities of the firms.
However, this in-depth analysis requires the availability of additional data referred to a
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wider time window. In this sense, the provision of empirical evidence on the existence of a
relation between the significant improvement on R&D expenditures and a strengthening of
innovation and economic performances of the firms will be the subject of future studies.
Notwithstanding, the main novelty of this paper consists in the development of a method-
ology able to include spatial interferences in causal analysis. This approach allows to
decompose the ATE in both direct and indirect treatment effects. On the basis of Hudgens
and Halloran (2012), we refer to direct effect as the response to the treatment, while the
indirect impact is the reply to interferences. However, the definition of interactions between
units can be ambiguous and potentially addressed in different ways. To overcome the
difficulties on the extent and the role of interferences we include in our analysis only their
”spatial” dimension.
More in detail, our methodological approach consists in the inclusion, in the regression
model of a Diff-in-Diff estimator, of a variable indicating the state of treatment of the neigh-
bours and the consequent interaction with own state of treatment and time. Moreover, under
this assumption we are able to distinguish between indirect effects on treated and controls.
This intuition is related to the idea that neighbours’ treatment can stimulate competitiveness
on innovation and labour market. This can generates both centrifugal and centripetal forces.
In fact, on the one hand we can expect the formation of stable network of firms in developing
R&D activities. Furthermore, the increase on competitiveness collides with the requirement
of more specialized human capital and the subsequent additional rivalry on labour market.
Differentiated effects on treated and controls allows to take into account the trade-off be-
tween policy effectiveness and the improvement of local competitiveness.
This point is of substantial interest for policy maker. Indeed, rethinking the role of interac-
tions between units as an additional instrument to foster innovation and growth, can lead to
a substantial refinement of public policies. From this perspective, the introduction of spatial
interferences in causal analysis allows the development of ”smart” policies able to maximize
the formation of spillover effects taking into account the spatial distribution of the units.
The estimates exhibit an higher intensity of the direct effects in comparison of the ATE,
while we observe negative and significant AITET and positive, but negligible, AITENT for
all the variables. This result has a twofold relevance. Firstly, the strengthening of direct
policy effectiveness implies a substantial improvement of firm capabilities to innovate in the
local market, even in absence of interferences.
Conversely, the negative AITET demonstrates the occurrence of congestion effect on labour
market that can have detrimental impacts on the additionality of the policies. These two
intuitions underline the relation between spatial distribution of the treatment and the objec-
tives of the policies. In fact, in the case in which policies aim to maximize the benefit of
being treated it will be preferable a dispersed distribution of the treatment (i.e. 0 or low level
of spatial interactions). While, in the case in which the Public Authority seeks to optimize
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overall territorial competitiveness, it is requested low-medium level of interactions12.
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the role of distance in estimating the spatial extension
of both direct and indirect effects.
Figure 4.6. Treatment effects dynamics in function of the distances
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Note: Figure shows the impact of the distances in the evolution of direct and indirect treatment effects. In detail,
panel (a) represents the Total R&D, panel (b) the internal R&D, panel (c) the external R&D, panel (d) other
sources of R&D and panel (e) the expenses per employee.
Figure 4.6 resumes the behaviour of treatment effects over space. Focusing on ADTE trend,
12We can imagine two different examples to resume these assumption. On one hand, we can think to policies
devoted to the formation of new firms. In this perspective, the aim of such instruments is necessarily the
maximization of the additional benefits of being subsidized. On the other hand, we imagine policies designed to
foster the growth in undeveloped areas. It seems reasonable to assume that this instrument aims to maximize the
spillover effects.
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we observe a stable path moving from short to medium distances, i.e. between 40 and 75 km.
However, the direct effect becomes bigger for a cut-off distance equal to 100 km. Conversely,
AITET exhibit a similar, even if diverging, path. More in detail, moving the cut-off distance
from 40 to 75 km entail limited variations, while AITET significantly worsens over longer
distances. Lastly, indirect effects on controls do not present significant variations when
cut-off distance changes from 40 to 100 km.
These results are in line with our expectation. They demonstrate that direct effect assumes
a primary role when the strength of the interactions between units is weakened. However,
the distribution of treatment effects over space suggests the possible occurrence of non-
linear interferences. The determination of the appropriate functional form to analyse spatial
interferences goes beyond the objectives of this paper, even if, to fully understand the role
of interactions between units in causal analysis, can be an interesting further step of our
research.
To conclude, this paper proposes a suitable empirical framework able to evaluate total,
direct and indirect policy effectiveness. Furthermore our novel approach could constitute
a turning point of the definition of political priority and efficiency of EU policies, taking
into account the relations between spatial distribution of the firms, knowledge spillovers and
local competitiveness.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis has discussed the role played by interactions between units in a causal framework.
The presence of interferences has a twofold impact on causal effects. On one hand, it can
allows to estimate spillover, or indirect, effects. Conversely, it has required a substantial
review of ”traditional” causal framework. Indeed, the golden standard in causal analysis
is represented by the so-called Rubin Causal Model (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983).
This approach, relying on the validity of the SUTVA, explicitly assumes the absence of
interferences between units(Cox, 1959). In this sense, in Chapter 1 we propose an in-depth
analysis on the problems related to the inclusion of interferences in estimating causal effects.
Moreover, we demonstrate, in a methodological way, how hierarchical and spatial techniques
can address identification problems(Corrado and Fingleton, 2012; Gibbons et al., 2014).
This thesis is deeply-rooted in this perspective. A recap of the main innovations and findings
presented in this work is nevertheless required. Recalling the initial summary, the thesis laid
out 4 distinct objectives resumed in 4 different research questions. During the remainder of
this chapter we will reply, separately, to every question, highlighting the main contributions
proposed in this dissertation.
How we can include spillover effects in causal analysis?
This question has required a substantial review of causal framework. In this sense, we
suggest two different approaches in modelling the presence of interferences in causal anal-
ysis. The common feature of both approaches is constituted by the modification of a
traditional Difference-in-Differences estimator.
The first method1 restricts the validity of the SUTVA. This hypothesis allows to take into
1see Chapter 2
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account geographical localization and market concentration. In detail, we have defined the
more developed areas in Umbria, assuming that the location in these areas can have an
impact on the effectiveness of regional policies. The second stage of this analysis consists in
imposing a restriction on the validity of the SUTVA. Moreover, we assume that interferences
are limited within developed and underdeveloped areas.
In this way, we explicitly rule out the presence of interferences between the areas. This
assumption allows to modify the Diff-in-Diff model to take into account geographical
localization. To summarize, we define two additional treatment effects on the basis of
geographical location of controls units, the ATEIC and the ATEUC. The ATEUC represents
the impact of the subsidies, taking into account the interferences; the ATEIC is a measure
of the error in the estimation of the effects when we wrongly assume the validity of the
SUTVA. However, the difference between ATEUC and ATEIC provides a measure of the
spillover effects in response of the subsidies.
The second approach modifies the DID model by including the presence of interferences in
its regression model. The idea behind this methodology is based on the adjustment of the
”traditional” potential outcome framework. In this way, we are able to decompose the ATE
in direct and indirect effects. Translating this intuition in a DID framework we provide three
distinct treatment effects (ADTE, AITET and AITENT).
The ADTE (Average Direct Treatment Effect) represents the situation in which there are not
interactions due to the treatment. The AITET (resp. AITENT) provides an estimate of the
indirect effects on the treated (resp. not treated) in response to the interferences.
What is the dimension of proximity more adaptable to causal context?
Boschma (2005) proposes a classification of the role covered by different typologies of
proximity (cognitive, organizational, social, institutional and geographical) in diffusing
innovation. Notwithstanding the relevance of the different typologies, in this thesis we
consider only the spatial dimension of the proximity. This choice is justified in consideration
of the subject of our analysis.
Indeed, the proposed approaches are deeply-rooted in a policy evaluation context. Recent
policies tend to stimulate innovation and growth by creating linkages between the different
economic agents. Moreover, empirical literature demonstrate a greater effectiveness for the
SMEs (see Merito et al. (2007); Bronzini et al. (2008) inter alia).
In this context, it seems reasonable to assume that interferences are influenced by geograph-
ical proximity. Furthermore, spatial closeness can provides a good approximation also
of the social proximity. Despite this, the inclusion of alternative dimension of proximity
will become an interesting topic for further research. The opening to different typologies
of proximity allows a disclosure of our novel methodologies to different fields, including
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labour, health, education, etc.
Is it possible to identify both direct and indirect effects?
Hudgens and Halloran (2012) propose a definition of direct and indirect effects. The
first is the response of the individuals to a treatment, while the latter represents the response
to the interferences between units. The identification of the indirect, or spillover, effects
requires the determination of an appropriate measure to approximate interferences. In the
case of SH-DID we use the state of treatment of neighbours units. This hypothesis can be
considered the optimal solution in a policy evaluation context. Indeed, our approach aims to
estimate the effects of interferences in response to treatment.
Notwithstanding, different functions can be considered, including nodal distance between
points in a network, social-economic indicators, geographical distance, etc. In this sense,
combining different proximity function to obtain a more robust approximation of interactions
between units can be a topic for further researches on this theme.
After having defined the interferences, it is possible to identify and estimate direct and
indirect effects. Following the definition in Hudgens and Halloran (2012), we estimate the
direct effect applying a double-differences in time and state of treatment for the units without
treated in their neighbourhood. In other words, the direct impact of a policy constitutes the
quota of total effect polished by the presence of interferences. Indirect effects constitutes
the residual part of the ATE (see Equation 3.3). In detail, SH-DID model provides estimates
of indirect effects by double-differencing over time and state of treatment of the neighbours.
Is ATE, in presence of interferences, biased?
This question is the most important issue raised up in this thesis. Montecarlo simula-
tions of SH-DID model provides satisfying evidences in favour of the unbiasedness of the
ATE, even in presence of interferences. Do not consider direct and indirect effects in a
setting where interferences are included does not allow to fully comprehend ATE. In this
sense, the decomposition of the ATE presented in the SH-DID model makes the researcher
able to estimate simultaneously total, direct and indirect effects.
Moreover, comparing the results of three different estimation procedure (linear, spatial and
spatial hierarchical approaches) we propose a unique methodological framework to provide
unbiased estimates of the ATE and its components. The best-fitting procedure is represented
by the Spatial Hierarchical DID model.
The unbiasdeness of the ATE even in presence of interferences requires an additional consid-
eration. This result does not invalidate the validity of traditional causal model. Nevertheless,
it highlight the need of modifying traditional causal methodologies in order to take into
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account the presence of interferences. In this sense it is possible to underline an additional
idea for future research. In fact, the causal framework proposed in this thesis can be easily
adapted to other methodologies and can constitute an initial step to a review of the traditional
approaches in causal analysis.
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